The Haves of Procedure by Meyn, Ion
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 5 Article 4
The Haves of Procedure
Ion Meyn
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1765 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol60/iss5/4
THE HAVES OF PROCEDURE
ION MEYN*
ABSTRACT
In litigation, “haves” and “have-nots” battle over what procedures
should govern. Yet, much greater hostilities have been avoided—a
war between the “haves” themselves. “Criminal haves” (prosecutors)
and “civil haves” (institutional players) litigate in separate territories
and under different sets of rules. This is good, for them, because they
have incompatible objectives. This Article contends that protecting
the “haves” from each other has profoundly influenced the develop-
ment of procedure in the United States.
The “haves” reap significant benefits in being insulated from each
other as they seek rules responsive to their unique preferences. A
“criminal have” seeks easy access to the forum and thus prefers a
permissive pleading standard. In contrast, a “civil have” seeks to
impede a plaintiff from bringing suit and thus prefers a demanding
pleading standard. As to discovery, “criminal haves,” possessing
actionable facts and seeking to control the pretrial distribution of
information, resist discovery and judicial involvement. In contrast,
“civil haves” often need information to pursue legal objectives, and
thus prefer a formal discovery phase, along with the option of
judicial intervention to temper instances of discovery abuse. The
procedural divide allows the “haves” to achieve these otherwise
incompatible objectives.
In the absence of a procedural divide, “criminal haves” and “civil
haves” would engage in contestation over what rules govern litiga-
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tion. This Article suggests that, should civil and criminal litigants
be subject to the same rules, as initially proposed during federal
reform in the 1940s, the introduction of litigants into a unified forum
would result in a fairer approach to procedure, mitigate existing
inequalities, and accomplish some litigation objectives of the “have-
nots.”
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INTRODUCTION
The schism that occurred between civil and criminal procedure
had significant repercussions for the future of litigation in the
United States. For centuries, civil and criminal procedure shared a
deep parallelism at common law.1 During federal reform to proce-
dure in the 1930s and 1940s, reformers initially sought to preserve
this uniformity.2 The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in large part imported the newly instituted civil rules.3
Behind closed doors, the full Advisory Committee—its membership
dominated by prosecutors who recognized the power-flattening
potential of the civil rules—rejected this proposal.4 The Committee
instead retained features of common law procedure that preserved
prosecutorial advantage.5 From this fateful moment, procedure
governing civil and criminal disputes took divergent paths.6 This
divide effectively insulated “criminal haves” (prosecutors) and “civil
haves” (institutional players) from each other’s influence, having a
profound influence on the development of criminal and civil
procedure in the United States.
Who are the “haves”? Marc Galanter gave the term robust
meaning when he proposed a framework to understand how the
“haves” use litigation to exert influence over the development of the
law.7 A “have,” compared to a “have-not,” enjoys superior access to
resources and to the store of information critical to assessing
liability, harm, and mitigation.8 A “have” gains expertise within the
constellation of rules that govern its world.9 A “have” tends to be a
repeat player, gaining familiarity with the forum for resolving
disputes and cultivating relationships with decision makers and
1. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 701 (2017).
2. See id. at 698.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 698-99.
5. See id. at 699.
6. See id.
7. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 135-36 (1974).
8. See id. at 125 fig.3.
9. See id. at 98.
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elite practitioners.10 Though “haves” seek to minimize loss and
maximize gain in any individual case, they may accept a loss to wait
for more favorable conditions before advocating for doctrinal shifts
in the law.11 In contrast, “have-nots” have comparatively little access
to information and resources.12 “Have-nots” have few contacts with
a forum; yet, if they are repeat players (such as criminal recidivists),
decision makers hold them in low esteem.13 “Have-nots” have every-
thing to gain or to lose in any single case, as each case is the liti-
gant’s “one shot.”14 This desperation will often benefit the “have” as
the “have-not” goes for broke at an inopportune time, resulting in
suboptimal interpretations of the law for subsequent “have-nots”
facing similar circumstances.15
Writing in the early 1970s, Galanter sought to temper a growing
optimism that litigation held redistributive promise as courtroom
victories and legislation in the 1960s disrupted the status quo.16 As
litigation was increasingly viewed as a vehicle to achieve social
justice,17 Galanter provided a counter prediction.18 Absent a sus-
tained political check on their designs, the “haves” would secure
interpretations of law responsive to their preferences on account of
their superior resources, access to information, and ability to forge
a long-term litigation strategy.19 Galanter predicted the long arc of
10. See id.; see also, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZJA-5DUR] (reporting on a strategy used by elite attorneys to divert
individual consumer claims to private arbitration to prevent class action claims before they
could form).
11. Galanter, supra note 7, at 98-103. For “civil haves,” this may be an interpretation of
law that limits the scope of regulation; for “criminal haves,” this may be an interpretation of
law that expands the scope of harmless error or the requirements to prove conspiracy.
12. See id. at 135.
13. Cf. id. at 117.
14. See id. at 100.
15. Id. at 110, 117 (“What might be good strategy for an insurance company lawyer or
prosecutor—trading off some cases for gains on others—is branded as unethical when done
by a criminal defense or personal injury plaintiff lawyer.”).
16. See generally id. at 135-36.
17.  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (recognizing civil litigation is not limited to disputes between private
parties, but significantly used to mediate issues of public law).
18. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 135-36.
19. See id. at 101-02.
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litigation would bend to the will of the “have.”20 Galanter’s theory,
however, focuses on the development of the substantive law and is
premised on the interests of the “haves” being aligned.21 But in the
world of procedure, the preferences of the “criminal haves” and “civil
haves” do not align. In the project to secure procedural preferences,
the “haves” are not stronger together. Quite the opposite. They are
foes.
Who are the “haves” of litigation? This Article defines the “crim-
inal haves” as state and federal prosecutors that bring cases against
indigent criminal defendants (“criminal have-nots”). Though this
definition excludes some defendants (such as white-collar defen-
dants) and yet includes a broad swath of cases (from misdemeanors
to murders), this definition captures the relationship that influences
prosecutors in seeking rules that apply to all criminal cases. In this
Article, “civil haves” are artificial persons, such as corporations and
government entities, sued by real individuals who allege civil rights,
consumer, and tort claims (“civil have-nots”).22 Although this def-
inition excludes certain relationships (such as “civil haves” suing
“civil haves”) and includes different types of disputes (from slip-and-
falls to antitrust), the definition seeks to identify the relationship
that influences the “civil haves” in determining what procedural
rules should apply to all civil cases.
These particular relationships give rise to the general preferences
of the “haves.” As the party that always initiates a case, a “criminal
have” seeks relaxed pleading standards that permit easy access to
the forum.23 In contrast, “civil haves” seek demanding pleading
standards that hinder an individual plaintiff ’s ability to bring suit.24
As to discovery, prosecutors resist formal procedures and seek to
exercise unfettered discretion to maximize leverage in achieving
20. See id.
21. See id. at 100-03.
22. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users,
53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (2006) (“As more of our encounters and relationships are with
APs [artificial persons], an increasing portion of our troubles and disputes are with APs....
[And] an increasing portion of matters ... are conflicts between individuals and
organizations.... And other sectors of the civil justice system are devoted mainly to individuals
seeking to hold APs to account.”).
23. Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 49,
55-56 (2014).
24. See id. at 55.
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pretrial objectives.25 In contrast, “civil haves,” at times in need of
information, seek to preserve core features of formal discovery.26
Despite the potential clash of these preferences, the “haves” do
not meet on the field. As they attempt to shape procedure, they are
free from each other’s influence. This is a modern development.27
Under common law procedure, the “haves” shared deep procedural
ties; for example, pleading standards for civil actions were “applica-
ble to an indictment” and “where the criminal law [was] silent as to
the form of an indictment,” a litigant looked to “pleading in civil
actions.”28 During the federal reform of procedure in the 1930s and
1940s, as substance was purged from procedure, the potential for a
unified forum became possible.29 Indeed, the initial proposal by
reformers was to tie the two sets of rules together.30 But an
alternative vision prevailed, and separate procedural territories
emerged.31 As a result, “civil haves” and “criminal haves” became
insulated from each other, governed by different procedural rules.32
It is this procedural divide that is the heart of this Article: How
has separating the “haves” of litigation influenced the development
of procedure? A rich literature provides insights into the develop-
ment of civil procedure; the historical studies of Stephen Subrin, the
political lens of Judith Resnik, and the empirical contributions of
Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang, to name a few.33 The inquiry
into the historical and political hydraulics of rule formation in
criminal procedure, however, is comparatively wanting. This Article
seeks to reveal how the procedural divide has influenced the
development of rules in each forum. This Article contends that the
war avoided between the “haves” of civil and criminal litigation has
25. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1094-95 (2014).
26. See id. at 1100-01.
27. Cf. Meyn, supra note 1, at 698-99.
28. WILLIAM E. MIKELL, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 158 (2d ed. 1918).
29. Meyn, supra note 1, at 698.
30. See id. at 708-09.
31. Id. at 712-13.
32. See id.
33. STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 70-71 (2017); Judith Resnik, The Domain
of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2224-26 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691,
717-29 (1998).
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had a significant impact on the development of procedure. Litigating
within separate territories, “civil haves” and “criminal haves” exert
conflicting preferences free of interference from each other. Absent
moments of political or judicial intervention, the procedural changes
in each forum respond to preferences of each set of “haves.” This
Article considers how the creation of a unified forum—subject to
civil rules as originally proposed—would require “haves” to contend
with each other’s competing preferences and pull other decision
makers, such as judges, into the crosscurrents.
This Article is also situated within scholarship that confronts the
justification for the procedural divide.34 An underlying question
addressed is whether criminal disputes should be subject to the
rules of civil procedure. The first draft of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, proposed in 1941, answered this question in the affir-
mative and followed “as closely as possible in organization, in
numbering and in substance the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”35
Viewing procedure as transsubstantive, these reformers proposed
a rule that tied the meaning of a criminal rule to the corresponding
civil rule.36 The full committee considering this proposal, however,
ultimately rejected this unification effort.37
34. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1621-25 (2005) (favoring increased discovery in criminal
adjudication); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 99-100 (2017)
(challenging demarcation between civil and criminal disputes); Russell M. Gold et al.,
Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1640-41 (2017) (proposing civil
discovery to inform plea bargaining); Meyn, supra note 1, at 720-24 (defining nature of
disparity between civil and criminal discovery); Meyn, supra note 23, at 44-52 (detailing the
impact of information disparity at key moments in civil and criminal litigation); Jenny
Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1108-12 (2004) (linking
suboptimal performance of defense counsel to lack of discovery); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia
Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 80-81 (2008) (challenging
justifications for the civil and criminal procedural divide). This recent scholarship follows
significant contributions since federal procedural reforms. See generally Robert L. Fletcher,
Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319-22 (1960); Abraham S.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149, 1192-98 (1960); Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision,
51 YALE L.J. 723, 735-46 (1942).
35. Meyn, supra note 1, at 710 (quoting Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Criminal Procedure, United States Supreme Court 17 (1941)).
36. Id. at 713.
37. Id. at 726-34 (providing an analysis of why the unification effort was rejected by the
full Advisory Committee).
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Among criminal procedure scholars and practitioners, the debate
has increased in intensity over the justification for the divide.
Supporters of the status quo contend that prosecutors in their role
as ministers of justice should be trusted to exercise appropriate
discretion in managing disputes, and that defendants would abuse
formal discovery to delay proceedings, intimidate witnesses, and
traumatize victims.38 Those partial to some degree of procedural
unification contend that increased factual contestation in criminal
disputes is necessary to obtain legitimate outcomes.39 For the
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient that there is a robust debate
over whether this segregation is justified. The focus of this Article
is the significance of the division: to consider whether the proce-
dural divide has played a role in influencing the development of
procedure, and if so, to what degree.
In Part I, the Article defines a “civil have” and a “criminal have,”
and explores how each set of “haves,” on account of their unique
relationships to their respective “have-nots,” results in opposing
preferences at key procedural stages: pleading and discovery. Part
II surveys the development of civil and criminal procedure from the
moment the “haves” of litigation were segregated in the early 1940s.
This study of historical trends reveals the responsiveness of the
resulting procedural regimes to the particular preferences of each
set of “haves.” Part III provides a more granular view of how each
“have” has shaped the pleading rules, a case study that reveals that,
in addition to rulemaking, judicial decisions have responded to the
preferences of the “haves.” In Part IV, the Article introduces another
influential player in the formation of procedure—courts. This Part
explains why courts have long been aligned with the preferences of
each set of “haves,” even though the two procedural regimes are so
different. This Part also identifies the few instances particular to
civil procedure when the alignment between “civil haves” and the
courts faltered, exposing dynamics that potentially benefit “have-
nots.” With these insights in mind, Part V explores how the
unification of procedure would likely result in compromise between
the territorial demands of the “haves,” mitigating existing inequali-
ties between “haves” and “have-nots.”
38. See Meyn, supra note 25, at 1127-31.
39. See Roberts, supra note 34, at 1120-21, 1154-55.
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I. THE “HAVES” OF LITIGATION AND THEIR PREFERENCES
A “have” operates in opposition to the interests of “have-nots.”
This Article defines the “criminal have” as a state or federal prose-
cutor who brings charges against an indigent defendant (these
“criminal have-nots” do not represent all “criminal have-nots,” but
as a group make up more than 80 percent of all defendants).40 The
“civil have” is defined as an artificial litigant, such as a corporation
or a governmental entity, that defends a case brought by an in-
dividual or group of individuals in a civil rights, consumer, or tort
case (the “civil have-nots”).41
In establishing a working definition, nuances are sacrificed, but
intentionally so—after all, the “haves” are forced to iron out nuances
and decide what rules will benefit them in most cases, even if in a
few cases such rules are suboptimal.42 For example, prosecutors in
the relatively few white-collar prosecutions may prefer that parties
have access to formal discovery, but this preference would entail
affording millions of indigent defendants with formal discovery
power, a bad bargain for the typical prosecutor.43 The definition of
40. Resnik, supra note 33, at 2224 (“It is widely recognized that the [prosecutor] ... is the
critical ‘repeat player.’”); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYV9-KV37] (“Over 80% of felony defendants charged with
a violent crime in the country’s largest counties ... had publicly financed attorneys.”).
41. Resnik, supra note 33, at 2225 (“In practice, civil rights claimants are blacks or women
or minorities, and, in civil rights cases ... defendants can only be ... governmental entities or
those who work for state and local governments. Although, in some kinds of cases,
corporations may be either plaintiffs or defendants, corporations are the defendant employers
in Title VII cases. In tort litigation, corporations are more frequently the defendants than the
plaintiffs.”).
42. Galanter, supra note 7, at 100.
43. A perception prevails that a white-collar defendant is a “have.” Scholarship says
otherwise. First, there has been a significant increase in the criminal statutes regulating
white-collar transactions. Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence,
Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 728-30 (2013). Second, white-
collar defendants are often subject to simultaneous, multiagency investigations. See Peter J.
Henning, Defense Discovery in White Collar Criminal Prosecutions, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 601,
605 (1999). Third, sentences have dramatically increased since the 1980s. Lucian E. Dervan,
Sentencing the Wolf of Wall Street: From Leniency to Uncertainty, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 91, 107
(2015). Even if white-collar defendants were considered “haves,” such prosecutions make up
fewer than 4 percent of federal cases. CYNTHIA BARNETT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA 2
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the “criminal have” is in part based on volume; the relationship
between a prosecutor and an indigent defendant is the prevalent
relationship, representing more than 80 percent of all state cases.44
Individual cases between these parties are, of course, factually
varied and different in type. Litigating a misdemeanor may be dif-
ferent than a felony, and a domestic violence case may present
different strategic considerations than a robbery prosecution. And
the treatment of similar cases will vary by jurisdiction; a drug
possession case that results in outpatient treatment in Shelby
County, Tennessee,45 might lead to incarceration in federal court.
Recognizing the significance of confounding features presented by
federalism, local tradition, and case specifics, the definition at-
tempts to capture the general dynamics that are expected to
influence across-the-board preferences of the “criminal haves.”46
Regardless of case differences, it is the dynamics of the relation-
ship between the prosecutor and the defendant that drive proce-
dural preferences. With an indigent defendant, the prosecutor
typically has in hand the information needed to bring the case to
trial.47 The prosecutor usually has at her disposal criminal codes
that provide an array of charging choices, which in turn may provide
for mandatory minimums and sentence enhancers.48 Armed with
(2002), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/E873-HWYJ]. State
prosecutions of white-collar crimes are rare. See Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in
Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 27, 38-39 (2015). And because white-
collar defendants often possess the information key to proving any liability, they tend to resist
formal discovery, a preference that may explain why white-collar interests are over-
represented on the Advisory Committee—as their antagonism to formal discovery is shared
by the typical prosecutor. See Meyn, supra note 25, at 1131 n.158.
44. See HARLOW, supra note 40, at 1, 5.
45. About Us, SHELBY COUNTY DRUG CT., https://drugcourt.shelbycountytn.gov/content/
about-us [https://perma.cc/KT77-MLWD].
46. There are always outliers to the typical dynamics. The prosecutor investigating
mobster James Bulger attempted to sidestep the Federal Bureau of Investigation due to
suspicion that FBI agents had joined Bulger’s racket, which was confirmed when an attempt
to work with state police earned a rebuke by the FBI’s top brass. Fox Butterfield, Ex-
Prosecutor Tells of Ties Between F.B.I. and Mob, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2002), https://www.
nytimes.com/2002/12/06/us/ex-prosecutor-tells-of-ties-between-fbi-and-mob.html
[https://perma.cc/C9PQ-U489].
47. See Meyn, supra note 25, at 1094-95, 1108.
48. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 161, 169 (2016) (observing the growth of sentencing systems that provide for severe
sanctions, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which “eliminated parole and
severely curtailed judicial discretion at sentencing,” as well as “created a sentencing structure
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this native power, a prosecutor brings charges against a party who,
if represented, is defended by an under-resourced, over-worked, and
under-trained defender who does not have access to the prosecutor’s
file or the procedural power to conduct a formal, independent
investigation.49 It is this relationship that drives the dynamics of the
majority of criminal law cases in state and federal courts, and that
in turn influences prosecutorial preferences.
The “civil have” must also make hard calls as to what preferences
should apply across all cases, at the expense of creating suboptimal
conditions in some cases. Like “criminal haves,” the “civil haves”
look across a varied plain. The same type of claim may be subject to
different procedures and choices of law. Party position is more fluid
in civil disputes, as individuals sue corporations and governments,
corporations and governments sue individuals and each other, and
parties have significant discretion to join other parties.50 Plaintiffs
can maximize influence through class actions.51 Recognizing con-
founding features again presented by federalism, local tradition,
and case specifics, the definition identifies the relationship between
devoted almost entirely to aggravating defendants’ sentences”).
49. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 690
(2006) (“[T]he vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent—the figure is over 80% in
state felony cases.”). A significant number of defendants do not receive representation, or are
provided undercompensated counsel. See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE
DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 64
(2009) (“In Mississippi ... [the monetary] cap most likely has a chilling effect on the right to
counsel by providing a disincentive for attorneys to perform work beyond the $1000 level.”).
For an analysis of what it means to exercise the agency to conduct an independent
investigation, see Meyn, supra note 25, at 1108-20. 
50. See Galanter, supra note 22, at 1376-77.
51. Multidistrict litigation also involves consolidation of claims; this growing method of
litigation comprises 36 percent of the federal civil caseload. Alison Frankel, A Handful of
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Dominates MDL Litigation. Is That a Problem?, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2017,
4:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/otc-mdl/a-handful-of-plaintiffs-lawyers-dominates-
mdl-litigation-is-that-a-problem-idUSKBN17T33G [https://perma.cc/BC7F-AVTZ] (noting that
in just over ten years, MDL grew as a proportion of federal litigation from 16 to 36 percent).
Players in this arena control their own destiny. Procedures that govern MDL can be custom
made, as “discovery ... committees” created by “steering and executive committees” provide
guidelines for the exchange of information. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S.
Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1445, 1459 (2017). Judges are scrambling to “fill the void with class-action analogies and
equitable powers.... [A]d hoc practices develop, creating unpredictability and variation in key
areas such as leadership appointments, compensating lead lawyers ..., and endorsing or
enforcing private settlements.” Id. at 1456-57. 
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“civil haves” and “civil have-nots” that informs across-the-board
preferences.
This relationship is between the “civil have” as an artificial lit-
igant (such as a corporation or a governmental entity), defending a
case brought by an individual plaintiff in a civil rights, consumer,
or tort action.52 Marc Galanter has observed the socio-legal salience
of the artificial entity versus the real person, observing that “an
increasing portion of matters taken up by legal institutions are
conflicts between individuals and organizations.... And ... sectors of
the civil justice system are devoted mainly to individuals seeking to
hold [artificial entities] to account.”53 This relationship often pres-
ents a scenario in which the “have” possesses information the “have-
not” needs to make the case.54 The “haves” view litigation between
“civil haves” to be a necessary part of doing business, but the
“haves” view cases brought by individual plaintiffs as counterpro-
ductive to business and governmental objectives.55 The definition in
52. See Galanter, supra note 22, at 1376-77 (noting corporations and government entities
were plaintiffs in 73 percent of contract cases, but only 6 percent of tort cases).
53. Id.; see also Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101
VA. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (2015) (analyzing effects of heightened pleading, finding the most
important factor was “the institutional status of the plaintiff and defendant. Indeed, this
Article suggests that individuals have fared poorly under the plausibility regime, at least
when compared to corporate and governmental ... entities”).
54. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 535, 561. Artificial entities tend to be able to weather higher pleading standards even
when they would not be expected to possess the information necessary to prosecute a claim.
For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Division will conduct a precomplaint
investigation with the assistance of the FBI. See, e.g., Brooke Seipel, Justice Department
Opens Civil Rights Investigation into Charlottesville Crash, HILL (Aug. 12, 2017, 11:48 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/346366-justice-department-opens-civil-rights-
investigation-into [https://perma.cc/8MNN-AMH4]. In Title VII or SEC matters, government
lawsuits typically follow an administrative investigation—where discovery powers are used
to assess the merits of the case. How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html [https://perma.cc/BN3K-ZEH5].
Government entities therefore prefer higher pleading standards to ward off civil rights actions
against them. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 532-33 (2010).
55. Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Before the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 113th Cong. 43 (2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/civil-rules-public-hearing-transcript-washington-
dc.pdf [https://perma.cc/79WC-5TVL] [hereinafter Hearing on Civil Procedure] (testimony of
Cory Andrews on behalf of the Washington Legal Foundation: “Everyone agrees that
discovery-related litigation costs are a competitive drag on the American economy. The
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some respects also looks to volume: civil rights, consumer, and tort
cases represent a significant portion of the civil docket.56 Reducing
the litigation footprint of these “civil have-nots” continues to be a
chief concern, almost existential in nature, of the “civil haves.”
The procedural preferences of the “haves” correspond to the
dynamics of these relationships. A “criminal have” seeks relaxed
pleading standards that permit easy access to the forum and fac-
tually opaque charges.57 In contrast, “civil haves” seek demanding
pleading standards that require factual detail and pose a significant
hurdle to any individual plaintiff that seeks access to the forum.58
As to discovery issues, a prosecutor initiates a case already in
possession of actionable facts.59 Police have already conducted an
investigation.60 Upon filing charges, the prosecutor’s chief function
is not to investigate but to secure a conviction.61 A discovery phase
would interfere with these objectives. In contrast, “civil haves” seek
to preserve core features of discovery. “Civil haves” need discovery
to assess the integrity and value of claims, and they need discovery
to develop defenses.62 “Civil haves” prefer judicial intervention to
exponential growth in discovery-related litigation, it doesn’t merely deplete the coffers of
Fortune-500 companies. Massive litigation costs can decimate small and medium-sized
businesses.”).
56. See UNITED STATES COURTS TABLE C-2, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: CIVIL CASES
COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS
ENDING MARCH 31, 2016 AND 2017 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_
tables/fjcs_c2_0331.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XAT-JB8C].
57. See Meyn, supra note 23, at 56-57.
58. See id. at 55-56.
59. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-4.3(a) (4th ed. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ [https://perma.cc/GG54-JAAQ] (“A prosecutor should seek
or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are
supported by probable cause, [and] that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
60. See id. § 3-4.2(c).
61. See id. § 3-4.3.
62. Testimony of the “civil haves” consistently reflects a need for discovery. See, e.g.,
Hearing on Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 30-31 (noting multiple exchanges in which “civil
haves” reveal the need to take more than ten depositions in cases). “Civil haves” also realize
discovery prevents litigation, as it dissuades a percentage of putative plaintiffs from filing a
lawsuit. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton & Derek A. Webb, Bold and Persistent Reform: The 2015
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 2017 Pilot Projects, 101
JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2017) (stating that discovery falls hardest on “small litigants” who can
be waited out by litigants with “long purses”); id. at 15 (small businesses, due to discovery
costs, “relinquish just claims simply because they cannot afford to litigate”). Corporations may
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check suboptimal behavior of bad actors, as opposed to any signifi-
cant dilution of discovery rights.63
Pleading and discovery rules are not the only areas of concern to
the “haves.” “Civil haves,” for example, seek to constrain collective
action of plaintiffs64—a problem never experienced by “criminal
haves,” who always occupy the plaintiff ’s position as the moving
party. “Criminal haves,” for their part, seek to ensure that constitu-
tional limitations on state power will not interfere with objec-
tives—a problem “civil haves” wish they had, but alas, they are not
blessed with inherent police powers.65 Pleading and discovery
issues, however, are not only critical features of pretrial litigation,
but are also susceptible to uniform treatment in civil and criminal
disputes.66 Thus, these junctures would be sites of major contes-
tation between “civil haves” and “criminal haves” if forced to litigate
in a unified forum. Yet, due to the demarcation, the “civil haves”
and the “criminal haves” seek to secure procedural preferences in
each other’s absence. Indeed, the development of procedure in these
separate forums corresponds to the preferences of each “have.” The
civil forum is increasingly characterized by demanding pleading
standards, formal discovery, and pretrial judicial engagement.67 In
contrast, the criminal forum increasingly features relaxed pleading
standards, the lack of formal discovery, and the absence of judicial
engagement.68 These two regimes are incompatible. They can only
exist as separate territories.
have significant discovery needs. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-
BLM, 2008 WL 66932, at *8-10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). Qualcomm’s patent enforcement
action against Broadcom might have been successful but for discovery that revealed a
nefarious plan by Qualcomm. See id. at *2-5. Qualcomm had engaged in a fraudulent plan
that was only discoverable through formal tools of extraction, leading to Broadcom’s successful
defense. See id. at *6, *8-12, *20.
63. Cf. id. at *9.
64. See Kenneth Terrell, Supreme Court Says Companies Can Ban Class Action Suits,
AARP (May 22, 2018), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-2018/
supreme-court-class-action.html [https://perma.cc/9FBW-3X3N].
65. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 722-23.
66. See id. at 708-09.
67. See supra notes 58, 62-63 and accompanying text.
68. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 725; supra notes 57, 59-61 and accompanying text.
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II. THE STATE OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Courts, the legislature, executive officials, and interest groups
influence procedural development.69 Operating within this competi-
tive milieu, the “haves” of litigation are well positioned to advocate
for their preferences. They are, relative to “have-nots,” well repre-
sented on each Advisory Committee.70 Advisory Committees propose
rule changes and receive comments.71 Within this structure, the
Chief Justice exerts significant influence through his appointment
capacity; he determines the committee’s composition.72 Since the
1970s, sentiments of chief justices have resonated with the prefer-
ences of the “haves.”73 Appointment trends reflect this, as “prac-
titioners on the [civil] committee are now disproportionately
corporate defense lawyers,”74 and prosecutorial interests remain
69. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 70; Resnik, supra note 33, at 2219-20; Paul
J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L.
REV. 69, 81 (2010); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-
Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 772-84 (2016) (identifying the multiple
stakeholders influencing outcomes, including business advocacy groups and media). See
generally Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1087, 1090-91 (2012).
70. Civil Advisory Committee: There has been a substantial shift favoring defense
practitioner representation versus plaintiff-side counsel. Judges outnumber practicing
attorneys and academics, combined. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 77-91. Attorneys
on the committee are “disproportionately corporate defense lawyers”; those who represent
plaintiffs tend to represent classes or individuals in complex litigation. Brooke D. Coleman,
One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1017-18 (2016). Criminal Advisory Committee:
The original membership was predominantly comprised of prosecutors. See Meyn, supra note
1, at 727-30. Since 1971, judges sit on the majority of the fifteen or so seats, with a seat
(sometimes three) reserved for a representative of the DOJ and one seat reserved for a federal
defender (since 1988). Coleman, supra, at 1017. Roughly two seats are reserved for the private
bar; between 2000 and 2015, five of the six of these seats were occupied by the white-collar
defense community (which shares preferences in line with DOJ as to discovery issues). Id.
71. Stancil argues that the Advisory Committee has the most influence on outcomes.
Stancil, supra note 69, at 82. He contends this influence is so strong that congressional
delegation of rulemaking power to the Advisory Committee permits opportunities for rule
changes that deviate, to some degree, from legislative preferences. Id. at 97-98.
72. See Coleman, supra note 70, at 1008.
73. Cf. id.
74. Id. at 1017-19; see BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 97-98; Dawn M. Chutkow,
The Chief Justice As Executive: Judicial Conference Committee Appointments, 2 J.L. & CTS.
301, 302-04 (2014); Stancil, supra note 69, at 99-100.
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disproportionately represented on the criminal committee.75 The
“haves” exert significant influence on the Advisory Committee
through public comment and advocacy efforts.76 The “haves” also
exert influence over decisional law, as significant caselaw victories
by the “haves” suggest.77
In investigating how rules respond to preferences of the “haves,”
this Article looks to procedural trends within the federal forum.
This analysis also provides insights as to many statewide regimes.
Reformers charged with crafting federal rules of civil and criminal
procedure anticipated the federal project’s impact on states.78 As
intended, the federal rules significantly influenced the development
of procedural codes in over half the states.79 Professor Jerold Israel
observed, as to criminal procedure, that “changes in the federal law
of criminal procedure automatically take on a significance that
extends far beyond a federal system that in itself handles only a
75. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 91 (finding Republican judges twice as
likely to serve on the committee as Democratic judges).
76. Much of the interest group influence occurs through informal processes and
connections. See Coleman, supra note 70, at 1020-23. The rulemaking process calls for public
comment, and during this period “interest groups are present in force.” Stancil, supra note 69,
at 100.
77. There have been several notable and recent wins in the civil forum. See, e.g., Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013) (immunizing class-action bars
in arbitration clauses from legal challenge); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
366-67 (2011) (imposing a heightened standard for certification of class actions); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (imposing a heightened pleading standard in all civil cases).
78. Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States
Supreme Court 218-19 (1941) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hearing on Criminal
Procedure] (Reporter James Robinson: “[T]hese rules are just not simply for federal courts
alone. We know that about 15 or 20 states have rule-making powers. Many of these ... states
are watching this committee to see whether the rules ... will serve as models for them [T]o the
extent that we can be specific rather than general we are serving not only the federal rules
and the federal courts but the state courts also.”). After federal reform, state bar associations
invited committee members in support of adopting the federal rules. See, e.g., Murray
Seasongood, Proposed Federal Rules for Criminal Procedure, 13 MO. B.J. 163, 163 (1942)
(committee member for the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure) (address
before the Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar Association on September 24,
1942). State commentators advocated that federal rules be adopted by states. See, e.g., George
H. Cohen, The New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 11 TEX. B.J. 213, 213 (1948) (“[The
Federal Rules] are so important, simple, and far-reaching that it is believed that many of
them will be adopted by various States.”).
79. See Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 495-96 (1982).
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minute portion of all criminal prosecutions.”80 In equal measure,
federal rules have been influenced by the needs and experiments of
statewide actors.81
A. How “Civil Haves” Fare
In 1934, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to create federal
civil rules.82 The Court delegated drafting to an Advisory Commit-
tee.83 The first Advisory Committee was “composed of nine lawyers,
five law professors and no sitting judges.”84 Leading the effort,
Charles Clark and Edson Sunderland addressed widespread dis-
satisfaction with pleading technicalities and trials by ambush that
common law procedure provoked.85 Borrowing from equitable prin-
80. Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 ANNALS 130,
130 (1996).
81. See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 746
(2016) (“States are ... laboratories of experimentation, allowing a small part of the nation to
experiment ... without damaging the whole.” (footnote omitted)). Federal reform of civil
procedure was influenced by state experimentation. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1999, 2016-17 (1989); Meeting Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Criminal Procedure Rules, Washington, D.C., 23 (Aug. 27-28, 1975) (“[T]he consensus of the
Committee [is] that alternative methods of charging crime are being successfully employed
in many states.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1721-22 (2004) (commenting that the expertise-based
federal code is integral to the decision of states to import federal rules).
82. Subrin, supra note 33, at 691-92, 710.
83. Congress delegated rulemaking power in the area of civil procedure through the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064; Stancil, supra note 69, at 76.
In 1934, the Court appointed members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Order for
Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774,
774-75 (1935), and disbanded it in 1956, Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S.
803, 803 (1956). In 1958, Congress created the Judicial Conference, which “established a
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and five Advisory Committees, to
amend or create the civil, criminal, bankruptcy, appellate, and admiralty rules.” Peter G.
McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1659 (1995). 
84. Subrin, supra note 33, at 710. Congress exercises a “negative option”: with the
exception of evidentiary privileges, proposed rules become law unless Congress intervenes
within seven months. Stancil, supra note 69, at 77-78.
85. Subrin, supra note 33, at 697-709. Edson Sunderland, who drafted the discovery
section, wrote in its absence, “[f]alse and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system
of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of litigation followed by surprise and
confusion at the trial.” Id. at 697. Sunderland was not concerned with securing an advantage
for a plaintiff or a defendant; he aimed to achieve systemic fairness, and he maintained that
only through pretrial discovery could “the true nature of the controversy be satisfactorily
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ciples, they crafted rules that gave plaintiffs easy access to court
and gave both parties the opportunity to discover facts before the
onset of trial.86 Given the nature of litigation in 1938, the “civil
haves” were not yet defense-oriented.87 Litigation was a more mod-
est affair, the range of legal disputes still constrained by common
law’s conservatism; claims remained limited in number and narrow
in scope.88 Professor Howard Wasserman described the litigation du
jour as simple diversity cases in “tort, contract, debt, and other
business disputes.”89
Yet, the design of civil procedure held the potential to transform
the nature of litigation. The new rules potentially mitigated the
impact of resource disparities.90 Under relaxed pleading require-
ments, a plaintiff could find easy access to the forum and use
powerful, but inexpensive, discovery tools to extract information.91
ascertained.” See id. at 709, 716.
86. Resnik, supra note 33, at 2221. The new system was characterized by, “ease of
pleading; broad joinder; expansive discovery; greater judicial power and discretion”; and the
“disengagement of substance” from procedure. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 923-24 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
87. Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 165 (2010) [hereinafter Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches];
Howard Wasserman, Discovery, Burdens, Risks, and Iqbal, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 2, 2009, 6:38
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/06/page/2/ [https://perma.cc/XC3H-
5RNX] (“A person or business entity was as likely to be a defendant as a plaintiff.... There is
far less interchangeability today—corporations and government are almost always defendants
(and repeat defendants at that) who know they will almost exclusively enjoy benefits from a
defense-favorable pleading regime.”).
88. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007).
89. Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches, supra note 87, at 159.
90. Power-flattening features of civil procedure are best attributed to the integration of
equitable principles. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1583-84 (2014); Resnik, supra note 33, at
2221 (noting the difficulty in plumbing the political intent of civil procedure authors); Subrin,
supra note 81, at 2050 (“[P]rocedural discourse and reform ... have always had a substantial
political dimension.”).
91. The responding party generally pays for responding. Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns
Manville Corp., No. 1:15-cv-00111-WTL-MJD, 2015 WL 7089725, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13,
2015) (“[T]he presumption is that the responding party pays for discovery requests.”); Rowe
Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The default
rule spares the requesting party from much of the cost: it is less burdensome to ask for
information than to track it down. With electronic discovery, cost shifting is more common.
CAL. CIV. PROC. § 2031.280(e) (West 2018) (requesting party must pay for the translation of
electronic data into a “reasonably usable” form, if necessary); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
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These potential dynamics remained unexpressed, however, and a
sense of stability prevailed for thirty years.92 The stability was
anchored in a conservative use of litigation. The true power-
flattening potential of the rules would lay in wait.
In the 1960s, new litigation fronts opened as procedural rules
facilitated class actions,93 and new laws gave rise to civil rights, tort,
and consumer claims.94 Congress incentivized private bar enforce-
ment through the provision of attorneys’ fees.95 Based on conclusory
allegations, plaintiffs gained entry to court and used discovery tools
to extract information to develop claims and refute defenses.
“[S]ocial legislation and public-law litigation” introduced a new
paradigm of litigation.96 Litigation was increasingly viewed as a
217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (shifting costs where requested information is not
reasonably accessible, among other factors).
92. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 542 (2001) (noting that Professor Maurice Rosenberg conducted
a survey in 1970 that concluded, “No widespread or profound failings are disclosed in the
scope or availability of discovery. The costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive ...
either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of litigation. Discovery frequently provides
evidence ... not otherwise ... available to ... parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or
settlement.” (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 (3d ed.
1997))).
93. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 72-74 (discussing how class actions were
transformed from a backwater procedure into an effective one); id. at 77 (noting discovery was
broadened during this period); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1586.
94. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73 83-84
(providing a private right of action against landlords and brokers for the refusal to sell or rent
based on protected classifications); Civil Rights Acts of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78
Stat. 241, 255 (providing a private right of action against employers for discrimination based
on protected classifications); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 187 (1961) (interpreting 28
U.S.C § 1983 to provide a private right of action against state officers); Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (1996)
(observing the significant shifts in political approaches to address social problems in the
1960s); Stempel, supra note 92, at 540 (“By the 1950s and 1960s, the liberal ethos of the Rules
on broad discovery became a central part of American litigation. On other fronts ... the judicial
system was also moving in a direction consistent with the ‘open courts’ ethos of the Rules and
a policy of relatively easy access to information.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen C. Yeazell,
Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil
Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1767-69 (2013) (tracing the formation of an organized
plaintiff ’s bar to after World War II); id. at 1771 (discussing rule revisions that facilitated
class actions).
95. Attorneys’ fees provisions, in part, were passed to “mobilize private enforcers.”
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1547.
96. Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches, supra note 87, at 166.
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fulcrum to force powerful players to account and agree to new
governmental and company policies over the settlement table.97
Litigation’s promise to achieve social and economic equality,
however, encountered a resistance that would reveal the durability
of Galanter’s underlying premise: in the absence of continuing
political intervention, litigation’s redistributive potential would be
blunted by the interests of the “haves.” The political intervention in
the 1960s triggered a conservative counteroffensive as “civil haves”
began to view procedural preferences through a defense-oriented
lens, giving birth to a movement to prevent the individual plaintiff
from gaining access to the forum. An ascendant conservative
Supreme Court, alarmed at the flood of cases brought by individual
plaintiffs, took on a more activist role.98 The courts and the “civil
haves” would join in an effort to reduce the cascade of cases from
individual plaintiffs.
The Court took a firmer grip on the reigns of rule-making power.99
The Chief Justice filled Advisory Committee seats with judges, and
for the first time, judges comprised the majority of members,
deepening the committee’s ideological alignment with the Chief
Justice.100 Justice Burger personally addressed his newly consti-
tuted Advisory Committee to express dissatisfaction with the liti-
gation explosion, shedding a veneer of neutrality that marked the
approach of prior chief justices.101 Underscoring a concern over the
surge of civil rights claims, Chief Justice Burger organized the
97. See generally Chayes, supra note 17 (recognizing civil litigation is not limited to
disputes between private parties, but significantly used to mediate issues of public law).
98. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1586-89.
99. Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends
in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 664-65 (1993)
(explaining that members of the advisory and standing committees are appointed by the Chief
Justice, affording “a major but often overlooked role in the formation of litigation policy” with
“substantial power to shape the litigation reform agenda through controlling membership on
important committees”); Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s
Civil Procedure, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 142 (1999) (“To put events in historical and
political perspective, we can look at the change in the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court
between 1953 and 1981. In the last decade of this period, the Supreme Court tended to move
toward the political ‘right.’”). This trend has remained stable since Chief Justice Burger took
the reins, passed to Chief Justice Rehnquist, then to Chief Justice Roberts. Cf. BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 33, at 84-85.
100. Membership of the inaugural Advisory Committee of Civil Procedure was “composed
of nine lawyers, five law professors and no sitting judges.” Subrin, supra note 33, at 710.
101. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 97-98. 
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Pound Conference of 1976, which was “the inaugural event of the
counterrevolution against ... liberal pleading, broad discovery, and
activist courts.”102 With Justice Burger’s appointment, and the ten-
ure of Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, the committee’s membership
of practitioners has skewed towards those with corporate clients.103
Since then, one hears a drumbeat of defense-oriented rule
proposals.104 The hydraulics behind these changes are complicated.
They occur within the Advisory Committees, but also, as Judith
Resnik observed, influence has come in the form of “lobbying efforts
directed towards legislatures and the public, by well-financed media
campaigns, and by support for conferences and meetings to address
and describe the ‘litigation crisis.’”105
In the 1970s, the concept of “discovery abuse” began to take hold
in the American psyche as industry groups lobbied for retrench-
ment.106 Though the plaintiff figured as the antagonist in stories of
102. Stempel, supra note 92, at 543; see also Subrin, supra note 99, at 142 n.15.
103. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 80-81 & fig.3.2.
104. Id. at 93 fig.3.5.
105. Resnik, supra note 33, at 2219-20; id. at 2226 (“[T]he politicization of rulemaking has
already happened—caused not by the vulnerable of the society but by the powerful.”); see
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1550 (“[T]he trans-substantive Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have become a site of struggle and contest by interest groups, legislators, rule-
makers, and judges who seek to control the procedural playing field.”); Coleman, supra note
70, at 1020-23 (discussing the significance of the Duke Civil Litigation Conference).
106. Subrin, supra note 99, at 142 (“In the mid-nineteen seventies, when the country at
large and the federal judiciary in particular were turning more conservative, complaints
deepened about discovery abuse.”). There has been an increase in interest groups seeking to
influence procedure. Stempel, supra note 99, at 669 (“[T]he past twenty years have seen
increased efforts of the business community and other substantive law interest groups to
shape legal change, both substantive and procedural.”). The sustained effort of business
advocacy groups is well documented. See Thornburg, supra note 69, at 773-75 (detailing the
concerted effort of corporate interests, in coordination with the Chamber of Commerce and
related groups, to publicize, with no empirical evidence, damage done by plaintiffs lawyers,
with references to a “litigation ‘explosion,’” “‘skyrocketing’ damage awards,” and “‘runaway’
juries”—rhetoric recycled by “business-funded institutes and Fortune 500 companies”).
Justices have been receptive to this message; Justice Powell, before his appointment, wrote
a memorandum to the Chamber of Commerce urging action against the growth of individual
plaintiff suits. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman,
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/
Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf [https://perma.cc/48N7-W4VE].
Justice Burger’s convocation at the Pound Conference in 1976 urged similar action. This
narrative found expression among officials such as Vice President Dan Quayle, claiming in
a speech to the ABA that “discovery is 80 percent of the problem” and has the potential to
“disrupt or put on hold a company’s entire research and development program.” Thornburg,
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discovery abuse,107 data revealed the typical case remained
“straightforward and less affected by tactical purposes.”108 In fact,
it was the complex cases between “civil haves” that frequently
presented conditions ripe for undue requests and disclosures, and
too-clever-by-half objections.109 Discovery permitted inquiry, but also
weaponized parties, potentially causing harm regardless of outcome.
The call to narrow the scope of discovery, politically aimed at con-
trolling the reckless plaintiff, also served as a pill self-prescribed by
the “haves” to check worst impulses.
The fundamental investment of the “haves” in discovery has re-
mained strong. Despite blazing rhetoric railing against discovery’s
downsides, actual reforms to discovery have been modest: discre-
tionary tools to extract information remain powerful. In the 1980s,
reform to discovery sought to identify levels of discovery that are
presumptively reasonable, along with clarifying guidelines for
reducing or expanding discovery in any particular case.110 In the
1990s, the Advisory Committee imposed presumptive limits on
depositions and interrogatories: preventing some toxic blooms, these
supra note 69, at 773-74. Yet, empirical data between 1971 and 2010 demonstrated that costs
of discovery had been in line with the stakes at issue. Reda, supra note 69, at 1089.
107. In 1986, the Insurance Information Institute launched a public relations effort dubbed
“We All Pay the Price,” including slogans such as, “The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for Babies,”
“The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports,” and “Even the Clergy Can’t Escape the
Lawsuit Crisis.” Thornburg, supra note 69, at 775 & n.69 (citing to multiple media outlets,
including Newsweek and Time Magazine, that recycled these claims). 
108. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 223; see also David M. Trubek
et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 82, 89-90 (1983) (finding the
typical dispute involved approximately thirty hours of attorney time, $10,000 or less in
damages, and involved five discovery efforts). These empirical studies were reaffirmed in
2010, when “elite lawyers, federal judges, and prominent legal scholars gathered at Duke Law
School to discuss the future of civil process,” where, many expecting confirmation of discovery
abuse, were presented with data from the Federal Judicial Center finding that “the federal
civil system is highly effective in most cases ... and that discovery volume and cost is
proportional to the amount at stake.” Reda, supra note 69, at 1087-89.
109. See Brazil, supra note 108, at 223; Trubek et al., supra note 108, at 82. There is, of
course, always the exceptional case of a “have-not” who knows no bounds. See, e.g.,
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997) (in a car accident
dispute, plaintiffs’ request for documents contained “121 numbered requests (some containing
as many as 11 subparts)” and 635 interrogatories).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26(f), 26(b)(1)-(2); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, “Just a Bit Outside!”:
Proportionality in Federal Discovery and the Institutional Capacity of the Federal Courts, 34
REV. LITIG. 655, 668-69 (2015); Stempel, supra note 92, at 545-46.
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caps could be waived for good cause and had little impact on the
typical case, which fell well within these limitations.111 Indicative of
the benefits of formal discovery to “civil haves,” in 1986 the Court
permitted a path for a defendant to secure summary judgment
against a “have-not” that relied on the use of discovery tools to prove
plaintiff could not muster sufficient evidence to proceed to trial.112
Another strategy of the “haves” to reduce abuse without diluting
the efficacy of discovery tools, was to exclude the individual plaintiff
from the forum altogether. Federal reform was founded on twin pil-
lars: easy access to the forum and easy access to information. The
“haves” sought to weaken the first pillar.113 For a half-century, Rule
11, a rule of conduct, laid inert, generating very few published
opinions each year.114 In 1983, Rule 11 was repurposed; it now per-
mitted “civil haves” to challenge a complaint not “well grounded in
fact,” an end-run around the lax-requirements of notice pleading.115
111. See Stempel, supra note 99, at 677 n.68.
112. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (permitting defendant to point to
absence of facts supporting an element of a claim, after sufficient discovery, to show plaintiff
cannot prevail as a matter of law).
113. The effort on the procedural front was also being fought on the substantive front. See,
e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1554 (describing efforts to place caps on fee
awards and quoting a 1983 memo of Michael Horowitz, General Counsel of the Office of
Management and Budget: “‘Not only the “public interest” movement but, more alarmingly, the
entire legal profession is becoming increasingly dependent on fees generated by an open-ended
“private Attorney General” role that is authorized under more than 100 statutes,’ a large
portion of which were enacted in the 1970s”).
114. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993
Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 10 n.27 (2002).
115. Jean Maclean Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIG. 16, 16 (1985); Catherine T.
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1099, 1143-44 (2002) (citing to examples, including instances of Seventh Circuit
judges aggressively interpreting the meaning and scope of Rule 11). Rule 8’s notice pleading
standard served as a cornerstone to the commitment to open courts and permitted conclusory
allegations under the theory that the merits of a dispute did not depend on the plaintiff ’s
initial access to facts, especially where the defendant possessed facts necessary to prove
liability. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The new Rule 11, undermining Rule 8, was lauded by the
defense community. Joan M. Hall, partner at Jenner & Block and past Chairman of the ABA
Section of Litigation, stated, “we perhaps may achieve the objectives stated by the advisory
committee—to reduce unnecessary delay and needless expense and to increase efficiency in
the administration of justice.” Joan M. Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69
A.B.A. J. 1640, 1644 (1983). The Legislative Committee of the Colorado Chapter of the
American Corporate Counsel Association drafted a civil rule “similar in concept to the new
version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” intended, one drafter noted, to
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The “haves” swung hard. Over the next ten years, Rule 11 generated
seven hundred published opinions each year.116 Between 50 to 60
percent of the sanctions were directed towards the plaintiff ’s
complaint.117 In some jurisdictions plaintiffs were subject to 80
percent of the sanctions imposed.118 The reinvigorated Rule fell
heavily on plaintiffs suing a defendant who possessed the facts
necessary to prove liability.119 The new rule subjected plaintiffs to
sanctions for any approach not “warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law.”120 Meeting this standard was subject to the predilections
of the judge, increasing risks to plaintiffs seeking new theories in
the realm of civil rights.121 The Advisory Committee also proposed
a discovery restriction that would land hard on those with modest
means—it shifted the discovery cost of responding to the requesting
party—but, this proposal was rejected by the Judicial Conference
(the membership of which is not appointed by the Chief Justice).122
In 2000, the scope of discovery—for decades permitting parties to
request information about the subject matter of the dispute—was
narrowed to questions concerning “claim[s] or defense[s].”123
Initially, this change may have only had a moderate consequence;
“change perceptions as to which causes of action should be brought” and that “lawyers may
develop their cases more thoroughly before filing,” and “[c]ases lacking merit which previously
were brought in the hope of obtaining a ‘nuisance settlement’ may not be brought.” A. Craig
Fleishman, Teaching Legal Malpractice in the Law Schools, 13 COLO. LAW. 1203, 1204 (1984).
116. See Hart, supra note 114, at 10 n.27.
117. Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937, 950
(2011).
118. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
943, 950, 953-54 (1992) (noting a study of 4494 litigators, which found that plaintiff’s side was
the target of sanctions in 70.3 percent of cases in which sanctions were imposed).
119. Cooper, supra note 117, at 949-50 (sanctions imposed were “disproportionately against
plaintiffs”).
120. Id. at 946 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
121. During the 1980s, for example, the Court curbed efforts to expand the law’s reach in
Title VII. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 120-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (reinstating
more robust disparate impact theory and removing complete defense in a mixed-motive case);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1989) (limiting an employee’s ability
to bring a disparate impact claim); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-51 (1989)
(permitting a Title VII claim for discrimination based on the failure to conform to stereotypes,
but also providing for a defense that could clear defendant of liability despite the existence
of such treatment).
122. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 114-15.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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under notice pleading, a plaintiff could arguably raise conclusory
claims and ask questions about all of them. In 2009, however, the
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal124 imposed a heightened pleading stan-
dard that resulted in sifting out a significant number of claims at
the inception of a lawsuit.125 The 2000 amendment now revealed its
power—a “have-not” was limited to asking about surviving claims.126
In a string of decisions that furthered the objective of “civil haves”
for the early removal of individual plaintiffs from the forum, the
Court gave full-throated blessings to arbitration contracts that bar-
red class actions, shutting off the tap of consumer-class litigation
and routing the drip of remaining cases to private arbitrations
governed by rules drafted by the industries being sued.127 Relatedly,
the Court in the 2011 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes128 case imposed
a heightened requirement to certify class actions,129 reducing
plaintiff-side collective action and resulting in a higher reliance on
multidistrict litigation (MDL) that provides a forum subject to its
own microclimate.130
124. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
125. See id. at 687. The complaint provided detailed factual assertions and clear notice of
each claim, but was found insufficient. See id. at 681, 687.
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
127. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013) (upholding
mandatory arbitration agreement that banned class actions and rejecting plaintiff ’s argument
that arbitrating on an individual basis would be irrational given costs of lawsuit and limited
potential recovery); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351-52 (2011) (finding
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state law bans on arbitration agreements that
waive class actions); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
IND. L.J. 239, 244 (2012) (observing that mandatory arbitration in employment and consumer
contracts are designed to deny claims, not reroute them); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra
note 10.
128. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
129. Id. at 367. To obtain certification, a plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements under
Rule 23(a), and one of three requirements under 23(b). The Court arguably inserted a 23(b)
requirement into 23(a) (substituting 23(b)(3) for 23(a)(2)). Id. at 368 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
see also Burch & Williams, supra note 51, at 1455-56 (discussing how Wal-Mart and other
decisions make “certification [of class actions] more onerous”).
130. Limiting routes to class actions contributes to a greater reliance on MDL disputes,
which are particularly vulnerable to “repeat-player” influence. Coleman, supra note 70, at
1011, 1031. MDL, in which hundreds of like cases are transferred to a receiving court that
manages common discovery issues, involves “something of a cross between the Wild West,
twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies”; an environment
in which repeat players excel. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All:
Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 111 (2015). The receiving MDL judge, who tends to become an expert in a particular
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On the discovery front, in 2015, proportionality factors131 were
integrated into the scope of discovery, empowering “judges to make
normative decisions about the claims at issue” and to exercise ideo-
logical bias under the cover of procedural fairness.132 The propor-
tionality rule was accompanied by a proposal that further reduced
the presumptive ceiling on depositions from ten to five, which
encountered fierce resistance from “civil have-nots” and a collective
shrug from “civil haves.”133 The indifference of the “civil haves”
revealed their comfort with pretrial judicial intervention and a
sense that a court would be receptive to demands of the “civil haves”
for any additional discovery.134 In contrast, “civil have-nots” view the
type of lawsuit and has exceptional power to shape outcomes, is susceptible to party influence.
See Coleman, supra note 70, at 1031, 1033-34. The receiving judge chooses the lead plaintiff
counsel, which can dilute independence. See id. at 1035-36. Empirical studies show a high
degree of “repeat players” on both sides of the equation, raising concerns of troubling loyalties
between defense and plaintiff lawyers and that the plaintiffs lawyers’ clients are the only
“have-nots.” Burch & Williams, supra note 51, at 1453-55.
131. Parties had been permitted to access information relevant to the “subject matter
involved in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s notes. The 2000 amendment
limited access to information “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Id. at 26(b)(1);
Stempel, supra note 99, at 531 (“Most substantively, [the amendment] accrues to the
detriment of claimants, particularly those of modest means but also major claimants such as
the United States government, while largely benefiting defendants.”). This proposal had its
roots in the ABA Litigation Section, Report of the Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 157 (1977), inspired by the Pound Conference organized by
Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 544 n.86.
132. Genetin, supra note 110, at 678 (discussing the significance of moving the
proportionality language embedded in Civil Rule 26(b)(1) to Civil Rule 26(b)(2)). Genetin’s
concerns are highlighted by cases such as Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), in which the appellate
court found the civil rights complaints of plaintiffs to be insignificant compared to the
important work done by government actors.
133. Hearing on Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 41-42.
134. Conversation between Judge Oliver and David Cohen, head of e-discovery at Reed
Smith:
Judge Oliver: ....What is your view about the five deposition limit or proposed
limit? Do you think that’s actually enough depositions, that’s all you need in
most of your cases?
Mr. Cohen: In most of the cases that my firm handles, they tend to be bigger
cases. There tend to be more depositions. Even with the 10-deposition limit, very
often there’s more. So I think judges are used to applying discretion.... So I like
the idea of that change to start the conversation and get people thinking, but I
think most judges when shown good cause are going to grant the extra depo-
sitions.
Id. Conversation between Judge Oliver and Marc Williams of Nelson Mullins:
Mr. Williams: I believe that five is a good default from which we can start, and
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narrowing of what is considered presumptively reasonable as a
signal to constrain their requests for additional discovery.135 Reform
in the 1930s created rules that permitted easy access to courts.136
This commitment to open courts has eroded. Professor Brooke
Coleman sums up present circumstances as civil procedure for the
“one percent.”137
I can tell you that the 10-deposition limit that we currently have has not been
a problem in cases where it’s justified to ask for more than that
....
I trust the judges that in appropriate cases that they will allow the parties to
take more than five if necessary.
Id. at 250-51.
135.  Conversation between Altom Maglio of a plaintiffs firm in Florida and Judge John
Koeltl:
Judge Koeltl: [W]hen you need to take more than 10 depositions, do the
parties usually agree or does the judge grant you leave to take more than 10
depositions?
Mr. Maglio: Well, it’s certainly seen by the judiciary ... as a yardstick as kind
of what’s supposed to be done in a typical case. And I have the burden to explain
to them that this is not a typical case, that this is much more complex than your
usual case and thus more discovery than typically allowed is necessary.
Judge Koeltl: But you do get it. The judges typically give it, right?
Mr. Maglio: But it’s a fight. It’s a fight. And I in my practice have been
successful in getting it when necessary. But quite frankly, with this rule change,
I fear that that will not be the case.
Id. at 31-32. Testimony of Anna Benvunutti Hoffman of plaintiff-side Neufeld Scheck &
Brustin:
Ms. Hoffman: In our serious civil rights cases, we always need to take more
than five depositions and routinely more than 10.... It is one thing to give judges
discretion to limit discovery, but by creating presumptive limits that we can
never meet, our ability to prove civil rights violations is left to the essentially
unreviewable mercy of the district judges to grant us an extension in every
single case.
.... 
[B]y changing the rule from 10 depositions to five depositions, you’d be
sending a strong signal that you think there’s too much discovery.... So I think
conscientious judges will take that signal and say, well, we’ve been allowing too
many depositions. 
.... 
The other issue is, to be honest, I mean, we’ve faced some judges who are—not
most, but some judges who are very hostile to our clients.
Id. at 110-11, 116-17.
136. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 2220-21, 2224-25 (noting that civil rules were written
to be neutral; nevertheless, roles played by “haves” and “have-nots” can disrupt intended
neutral operation of rules).
137. See Coleman, supra note 70, at 1008-09.
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B. How “Criminal Haves” Fare
The trajectory of civil procedure generally responds to preferences
of the “civil haves.”138 A demanding pleading standard restricts
plaintiffs without access to sufficient prelitigation evidence from
gaining access to court.139 Though the scope has been narrowed
and presumptive limits have been installed, core discovery tools
have been preserved, with broad discretion given to judges to
ratchet discovery up or down in any particular case.140 The path of
criminal procedure has taken a starkly different course. Criminal
procedure is characterized by relaxed pleading requirements,
resistance to judicial intervention, and the rejection of a discovery
regime.141 These key features of criminal procedure reflect a mirror
opposite of civil procedure.
Three years after the reform of federal civil procedure, the Court
convened a new Advisory Committee to reform criminal proce-
dure.142 The committee’s reporter, former prosecutor and professor
James Robinson, worked for six months with his staff to create the
first draft.143 Turning to civil procedure, the team proposed a draft
that tracked its structure and much of its content.144 Criminal
disputes would be largely subject to the federal rules of civil pro-
cedure, and interpretations of a civil rule would govern the meaning
of any corresponding criminal rule.145 This proposal was introduced
to the full committee.146 Most committee members had served as
138. See id. at 1008.
139. See id. at 1041, 1043-44.
140. See id. at 1069-70.
141. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 725, 734.
142. See id. at 707-08.
143. Id. at 708.
144. This path enjoyed significant support in legal and political circles. Comment, Reform
in Criminal Procedure, 50 YALE L.J. 107, 108 & n.8 (1940) (arguing that “the task of reforming
civil procedure should be sharply distinguished from the task of improving criminal pro-
cedure,” but noting, “[t]his distinction is not usually recognized”). Historically, civil and
criminal procedure developed in concert and shared many similar features. See Meyn, supra
note 1, at 701-02. Within the academy, Jerome Hall, a criminal procedure scholar, viewed civil
rules to be neutral and well situated to govern criminal disputes. See Hall, supra note 34, at
739.
145. Proposed Rule 2 tied the meaning of any criminal rule to that of its civil counterpart.
Meyn, supra note 1, at 713-14.
146. Id. at 712.
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prosecutors for a significant portion of their careers.147 Not one
identified as a criminal defense attorney.148
The full committee did import notice pleading and joinder
provisions analogous to the new rules of civil procedure.149 Consis-
tent with Indiana’s Assistant United States Attorney Alexander
Campbell’s request to reject any rule that might require a prosecu-
tor to “disclose information that might be harmful to ... the govern-
ment’s case,”150 the committee, however, rejected the imposition of
any formal discovery phase.151 Distributed for public comment, the
committee’s revised draft received strong support in the prosecuto-
rial community.152 Adopted by Congress in 1946, prosecutors lauded
the federal code, and over half the states imported key provisions of
these federal rules, including notice pleading.153
These reforms deepened prosecutorial advantage.154 The new fed-
eral rules made it easier for the prosecutor to bring and consolidate
charges.155 By virtue of relaxed pleading requirements and the
absence of a discovery phase,156 a judge had no role. The federal
rules ceded pretrial proceedings to the prosecutor, who maintained
discretion to withhold or distribute information.157 This dramatic
distribution of procedural power to a nonjudicial executive officer
notably occurred before significant revelations of federal due
147. Id. at 728-29.
148. See generally Hearing on Criminal Procedure, supra note 78.
149. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 715, 734 (finding that the only civil rules adopted were
those that favored prosecutorial intentions, such as permitting the issuance of a summons,
notice pleading, and joinder).
150. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the District Courts of the United States R. 16 note (Sept. 8, 1941) (on file with author).
151. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 720-24.
152. See id. at 725.
153. See 91 CONG. REC. 17 (1945) (letter from Attorney General transmitting the Rules of
Criminal Procedure); H.R. DOC. NO. 12, at iii-v (1945). For comments by those advocating for
statewide adoption, see, for example, Glenn R. Winters, A Study of Rules 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Particular Respect to Their Suitability for Adoption
into State Criminal Procedure, 25 OR. L. REV. 10, 10 (1945) (“The new Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure ... offer the bright hope that ... they also may exert a beneficial influence
upon the local procedure of the forty-eight states.”).
154. Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1192 (“[The Rules of Criminal Procedure] aggravate[d]
the tendencies toward inequality between [the] state and [the] accused.”); Meyn, supra note
1, at 725-26.
155. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 725.
156. See id. at 725-26.
157. See id. at 719-20, 724.
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process. At this time, there was no federal right to counsel and no
significant restriction on the executive’s precomplaint investigative
power.158
In effect, reformers had carved out separate procedural territory
free from any interference of the “civil haves.” The new federal rules
created conditions for the efficient processing of criminal disputes;
after reform, procedural disputes constituted “a small share of
criminal litigation.”159 Through the 1950s, little pretrial discovery
occurred in federal or state disputes.160 Professor Robert Fletcher
contemporaneously observed, “despite the full development of dis-
covery in civil cases, denial in criminal cases has persisted,”161 and
Professor Kenneth Pye commented that a defendant would “learn
little concerning the Government’s case unless the [prosecutor] de-
sires to let him have [it].”162
Challenges to the status quo, however minor, met fierce resis-
tance.163 Where a defendant requested a copy of his own confession
158. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (denying defendant’s attempt to extend
due process to require a right to counsel in noncapital cases); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) (excluding physically coerced confessions); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
(requiring fair juries); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requiring counsel for indigent
defendants in capital cases); Klarman, supra note 94, at 62 & n.279 (stating that the few
federal constitutional protections were primarily limited to addressing “Jim Crow courts’
dispensation of mob-dominated justice to black criminal defendants”); Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2004) (“As a practical matter ... the only
constitutional protections that mattered for the vast majority of criminal defendants [before
the 1960s] were those available in state, as opposed to federal, courts.”).
159. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2003 (2008).
160. See Sheldon Krantz, Comment, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for
Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127, 144-51 (1963) (few states provided pretrial
discovery in criminal disputes). In states wedded to common law procedure, courts found no
authority to expand discovery. See, e.g., Walker v. People, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (Colo. 1952),
superseded by statute, Colo. Crim. P. R 16(I)(d)(1), as recognized in, People in Interest of E.G.,
368 P.3d 946, 951 (Colo. 2016) (en banc) (finding discovery in criminal cases a radical
departure from common law); State v. Dist. Court, 342 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Mont. 1959) (“It is
admitted that under the common law there is no right to have inspection of evidence ... of the
prosecution.”).
161. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 294.
162. A. Kenneth Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Procedure,
52 GEO. L.J. 675, 682 (1964) (“[A defendant] has no right to inspect the results of scientific
examinations.... [H]e is even denied access to his own ... statements.... [A]nd he cannot see
FBI reports or witness’ statements. He is not entitled to know the names of the witnesses who
will be called to testify against [him].” (footnotes omitted)).
163. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
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under the rule permitting access to documents “obtained from or
belonging to” the defendant, the Department of Justice (DOJ) suc-
cessfully argued that the confession did not qualify because it “was
not a pre-existing document.”164 Resistance was also organized. In
State v. Tune,165 where the defendant also asked to view a copy of
his confession, twenty of twenty-one counties joined New Jersey’s
opposition.166 Though prosecutors exercised unfettered discretion
during Jim Crow conditions and in the absence of counsel, through
judicial intervention and due process constraints, the prosecutorial
community nevertheless portrayed the system as one that gave “the
accused ‘every advantage.’”167
In the 1960s, the Court announced a series of due process
limitations on the exertion of state power.168 At the same time,
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 282 (regarding ideology); id. at 284-85, 288 (regarding rigid
resistance). Ideology, though, may be secondary to institutional role; it was Marc Galanter’s
insight that repeat players seek rules that favor litigation objectives. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text. As to institutional self-interest, David Louisell, in 1961, asked a
prosecutor about the prospect of extending civil discovery to defendants: “Since I am a product
of the adversary system, I would do everything possible to limit and restrict what the defense
might compel me to disclose.... I’m sure ... I could frustrate all of the supposedly noble
purposes of discovery.” David W. Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice
of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921, 928 (1961).
164. David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
56, 72 (1961); see also United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 814, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1962)
(upholding the trial court's ruling that denied the defendant access to transcripts of
statements from the IRS).
165. 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953).
166. See id. at 882; see also Fletcher, supra note 34, at 299 (explaining that New Jersey
later reversed its stance).
167. Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1151; see also David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders
Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1736 (1993) (noting “the amount of ink spilled over the
years by law-and-order conservatives anguished about the excessive rights of the accused”).
This narrative of the disadvantaged prosecutor led some courts to further relax pleading
requirements for prosecutors. See Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1152, 1177; see also State v.
Torrance, 125 A.2d 403, 406-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956). During the first third of the
twentieth century, apartheid was the “governing system that pervaded half the country, and
like any such system it was implicitly and explicitly supported by the Constitution.” Robert
M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287,
1316 (1982). Until the 1940s, in the South, thousands of black men were sent to slavery and
death based on spurious criminal charges. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER
NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD
WAR II 375-82 (2008); see also TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 27-28 (1947), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights2.
htm [https://perma.cc/5PQY-XHZM] (discussing inequality in the legal system).
168. See Lain, supra note 158, at 1363-64, 1363 n.13 (discussing the hallmarks of the
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Gideon v. Wainwright169 provided indigent defendants the right to
counsel.170 Their ranks reinforced, public defenders pushed for more
discovery and made the type of incremental advance one expects in
trench warfare.171 The rules still did not provide for the revelation
of the State’s witnesses, and did not afford defendants any dis-
cretionary discovery power to conduct an independent investigat-
ion.172 Prosecutors would claim Brady v. Maryland173 conferred
unique and special treatment to the criminal defendant, but Brady
was never intended to give defendants a general right of discovery;
and legally, Brady is a paper tiger.174 Within the broader social
Warren Court: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule for
Fourth Amendment violation); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (placing limits
on police encounters involving brief detention); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54,
358-59 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment to apply where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 498-99 (1966) (requiring individuals
in custody to be apprised of their right to silence and to counsel)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (providing right to counsel); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(holding government must disclose material and exculpatory information in its possession
before trial); Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 (“In the sixteen years of Chief Justice Warren’s
tenure, the Supreme Court decided upwards of 600 criminal cases.”).
169. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
170. Id. at 344-45.
171. “Gideon ... led to the growth of both public defenders’ offices and ineffective assistance
doctrine.” William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2192 (2002);
see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the
Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2426 n.33 (1996) (discussing the rapid expansion of public
defender system after Gideon).
172. Superintended by the Warren Court, new disclosure requirements were largely limited
to documents helpful to the government (documents it would use in trial), or documents
already known to the defendant; defendants were not entitled to the names or statements of
witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)-(b). The rules still do not “require the parties to disclose
witnesses.” ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 417 (2011). Views on the
significance of changes to the federal rules widely differ. Compare Susan R. Klein, Monitoring
the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 570 (2013) (“The 1966 amendments explicitly permitted
discovery in criminal cases and hugely increased the range and scope of pretrial discovery.”),
and Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH.
U. L. REV. 641, 652-53 (1989) (contending that the 1966 reciprocity provision advantaged the
State), with Meyn, supra note 25, at 1094 (disagreeing and observing no amendment has
provided discretionary discovery), and Sara Kropf et al., The ‘Chief’ Problem with Reciprocal
Discovery Under Rule 16, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 20 (arguing that Rule 16 is harmful
to defendants). 
173. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
174. See Brennan, Jr., supra note 163, at 8-9. Though Brady has motivated prophylactic
disclosures to avoid its violation, compared to civil discovery, Brady generates negligible
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milieu of changing attitudes in the 1960s, scholarship criticized the
criminal and civil procedural divide.175 In this spirit of reassess-
ment, Florida and Vermont passed legislation affording depositions
to criminal defendants.176 A backlash, however, brewed as the
Warren Court’s expansion of due process rights and the imposition
of new disclosure requirements fueled the narrative of prosecuto-
rial disadvantage. The political upheaval of the 1960s gave rise to
buried resentments as dog-whistle politics ignited dark impulses of
the electorate.177
The 1970s marked a hard return to crime control dogma and a
“revolutionary expansion ... in criminal discovery by the prosecution
litigation. Brady’s scope is narrow (only information deemed material and exculpatory from
the prosecutor’s perspective), id., and its efficacy was diluted in United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622 (2002), which held that Brady has no application to pleas (which comprise at least
95 percent of all cases), 536 U.S. at 632-63. Brady information is not discoverable until the
eve of trial, when prosecutorial resistance is at its highest. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing
Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (2015). Prosecutors are apt to claim that less discovery
to criminal defendants is justified due to Brady’s demands and because the prosecutor’s
burden of proof at trial is high; notably, these due process rights all postdate the creation of
the federal rules of criminal procedure. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. See Fletcher, supra note 34, at 305-07; Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1192-93
(advocating for incorporation of civil discovery); Hall, supra note 34, at 739; Krantz, supra
note 160, at 143-44; Louisell, supra note 164, at 72 (noting inherent limitations of Rule 16);
id. at 100-01 (arguing for greater discovery with narrow exceptions); Pye, supra note 162, at
688-90; Comment, Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1057, 1060
(1961) (recommending exchange of witness lists and depositions); Comment, Pre-Trial
Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 640-46 (1951) (recommending adoption of civil
discovery). A few judges explicitly recognized disparities between civil and criminal procedure.
See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
228, 233 (1964) (“There are no procedures analogous to the depositions and interrogatories,
requests for admissions, or compulsory medical examinations authorized for civil cases.”).
176. As to Vermont, see 1961 Vt. Act & Resolves 174-76, see also Peter Forbes Langrock,
Vermont—An Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A. J. 732, 732 (1967) (describing
legislative history of Vermont’s discovery statute). As to Florida, which adopted a court-
created rule of discovery in 1968, see In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 211 So. 2d 203,
205 (Fla. 1968).
177. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS 35 (2014) (“Wallace, Goldwater, and
Nixon recognized and sought to take advantage of existing bigotry in the voting public, bigotry
they did not create but which they stoked, legitimized, and encouraged.”); Lain, supra note
158, at 1364 (“[The Warren Court’s decisions] faired poorly in major public opinion polls,
triggered contrary legislation, and even inspired a backlash ‘law and order’ campaign that
helped send Richard Nixon to the White House in 1968.”); Luban, supra note 167, at 1750
(“[T]he repeated cry by conservative politicians for ever-more-savage criminal punishments
presents a clear case of state-power-maintenance through scapegoating.”).
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against the defense.”178 The Court’s decision in Williams v.
Florida179 diluted the perceived breadth of a defendant’s right
against self-incrimination, granting “states carte blanche [author-
ity] to develop discovery rules that give the prosecutor an independ-
ent right to obtain even potentially incriminating information.”180
Though prosecutors maintained that defendants should not learn
names of state witnesses, prosecutors could learn names of defen-
dants’ witnesses, arguing that absent prosecutorial review, defen-
dants would fabricate evidence.181 Courts expanded prosecutorial
access to defenses and the identity and statements of defense wit-
nesses.182 Meanwhile, the Burger Court recognized broad exceptions
to due process, removing constraints on searches and interrogations,
diluting discovery rights, and narrowing avenues of appellate
review.183 The Burger Court facilitated a “transition from a due
178. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1986).
179. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
180. Mosteller, supra note 178, at 1571 (emphasis added); see also Williams, 399 U.S. at
82-83 (holding that a statute requiring defendant to inform the prosecutor of an intent to
bring an alibi defense does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment, which is limited to the right
not to testify).
181. See Pye, supra note 162, at 682 (looking to jurisdictions where the prosecution is
required to turn over little, but the “defendant is required to reveal the names of all his
witnesses”). As to whether a criminal defendant would attempt to encourage perjury, a major
source of resistance to ushering in discovery to civil rules was also perjury. Subrin, supra note
33, at 715 n.151. Also, criminal defendants do not have a monopoly on perjury; law en-
forcement officers are repeat offenders. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the
Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75,
82-83 (1992) (noting studies estimate police commit perjury between 20 and 50 percent of the
time that they testify on Fourth Amendment issues); Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The
Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Sup-
pression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 761-62 (1999) (documenting widespread
examples of police perjury). Another source of widespread perjury benefits the State:
informants. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Conse-
quences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 664 & n.85 (2004) (noting “numerous horror stories of
fabrication and perjury by informants”).
182. Mosteller, supra note 178, at 1571 (“[C]ourts have all but written off the [F]ifth
[A]mendment as providing any restriction upon discovery of information that the defendant
may ultimately want to introduce at trial.”); id. at 1579 (“Discovery against the criminal
defendant expanded tremendously in many states beginning in the 1970s.... [T]wenty-five
states grant the prosecution an independent right to receive discovery from the defense of at
least one of the following: defenses, witness names, statements of witnesses, reports of
experts, or documents and tangible evidence.”).
183. See Luban, supra note 167, at 1736-40; Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court’s
Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States
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process-oriented criminal justice model to a model that ... placed
increasing emphasis on crime control and crime prevention,”184
placing a “heavy burden ... to demonstrate the unlawfulness” of
government conduct.185 Scholarship critiquing disparities between
civil and criminal procedure fell conspicuously quiet.186
The conservative, then bipartisan, political commitment to tough-
on-crime policies in the 1980s replaced aspirations of rehabilitation
with fierce notions of retribution.187 Although Galanter focused on
how actors seek advantage in light of their position, he also credited
larger forces at play.188 As one descends into criminal law, external
forces intensify; parties navigate strong currents of racial and class
prejudice.189 Over 80 percent of defendants charged with a felony
Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 471-72 (1985). Although the Court arguably extended
Brady’s scope as to what constituted “material” evidence, see, for example Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995) (extending Brady to apply to information material to a colorable
defense that the State failed to adequately investigate), and see Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (holding impeachment evidence, including testimony procured in
exchange for a benefit, can be material), the Court also clarified that Brady does not apply to
the pretrial period in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625, 632 (2002) (holding Brady has
no application to plea bargains, which comprise at least 95 percent of all cases).
184. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992).
185. Whitebread, supra note 183, at 471.
186. See Michael L. Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let’s Cut Off the
Prosecutor’s Hands, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 238 (1981) (noting reduction in criticism of criminal
procedure since the 1960s); Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery
Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 855 (1995) (“In the early 1960’s, several prominent scholars and
jurists argued for expanded discovery in criminal litigation.”); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note
49, at 683-84 (announcing in 2006, “[t]his is a plea for comparative work in civil and criminal
procedure”). Some voices in the wilderness between 1970 and 2005 addressed the procedural
disparity. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 167, at 1737-38; Montoya, supra, at 856.
187. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 58-61 (2006); Avlana
K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 81
(2016) (“The drastic increase in incarceration levels can better be explained by a bipartisan
political movement beginning in the 1970s that was characterized by ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric
and the ‘war on drugs.’”). The work of criminal law scholars has deepened the understanding
of forces that identify and process defendants. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1-9 (2012); Hessick &
Berman, supra note 48, at 169-70 (“[T]he rehabilitative ideal came under attack in the second
half of the twentieth century,” and sentencing policies shifted to aggravating factors and
priors).
188. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 123-24. A litigant’s resources determine much. A rule
favoring a “have-not” may be underutilized due to “limited resources for their
implementation.” Id. at 124.
189. See JAMES BALDWIN, NO NAME IN THE STREET 149 (1972) (“[I]f one really wishes to
know how justice is administered ... one does not question the policemen, the lawyers, the
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qualify for a public defender,190 and by 1990, a quarter of all black
men would be under correctional supervision.191 Galanter observed
that a repeat player had an opportunity “to develop facilitative in-
formal relations with institutional incumbents.”192 But repeat con-
tacts can have an opposite effect, salient to criminal matters where
law enforcement officers disproportionately sweep up men along
racial lines, resulting in stark racial disparities in incarceration and
supervision rates.193 The appearance of repeat criminal defendants
reinforces prejudice that fuels a vicious feedback loop.194 Since the
1980s, officer ranks have grown, investigative tools have become
more powerful, and courts have increased officer discretion.195
judges, or the protected members of the middle class. One goes to the unprotected—those,
precisely, who need the law’s protection the most!... [A]sk any Mexican, any Puerto Rican, any
black man, any poor person ... how they fare in the halls of justice, and then you will know.”).
190. Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 739, 748 (finding over 80 percent of those accused of a felony are deemed indigent).
191. Luban, supra note 167, at 1750.
192. Galanter, supra note 7, at 99. 
193. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting
officers mark “Furtive Movements” for black subjects at a significantly higher rate than white
subjects); Wilson v. Tinicum Township, No. 92-6617, 1993 WL 280205, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. July
20, 1993) (certifying class action for officer profiling); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 273 (1996) (noting that in interrogations, “[t]he
primary detective was typically white (69%)” and “[t]he typical suspect ... was a young, lower
or working class, African-American male”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness,
and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775,
818 (1999) (“[T]argeting Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrests,
reinforcing the presumption of Black criminality.”); Stephanie Francis Ward, Stopping Stop-
and-Frisk, 100 A.B.A. J. 38, 40 (2014) (“[I]n 2011 and 2012 blacks and Hispanics represented
87 percent of all people stopped by New York City police.”); Maura Dolan & John M. Glionna,
CHP Settles Lawsuit Over Claims of Racial Profiling, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2003), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-feb-28-me-search28-story.html [https://perma.cc/
6TYQ-TBFG] (announcing civil settlement related to the California Highway Patrol pulling
over Latinos at three times the rate of whites, and Black drivers at 1.5 times the rate of
whites).
194. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009) (noting that sentences for black defendants are 12
percent longer, bail is 25 percent higher, and the risk of receiving the death penalty is also
higher than that of white defendants).
195. See Robert García, “Garbage In, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer
Reliability, and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1055-61 (1991) (identifying powerful
new investigative technology); Gershman, supra note 184, at 394 (noting that as power to
investigate increased, courts limited the application of the exclusionary rule); Tracey Maclin,
The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment of the Streets, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1334 (1990) (noting an increase in the investigative power of police); Dru
Stevenson, Effect of the National Security Paradigm on Criminal Law, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
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Sweeping criminal statutes expanded prosecutorial routes to se-
curing a conviction.196 These circumstances, coupled with increased
penalties, have steadily increased a prosecutor’s leverage.197 The
confluence of “the prosecutor’s investigating, charging, convicting,
and sentencing powers,” coupled with “the ‘inherent inequality’
between the prosecutor and the defendant” has, as Bennett
Gershman observed, rendered the “adversary system almost
obsolete.”198
Unmindful as to how growing leverage of police and prosecutors
might overwhelm any procedural gains, scholars have observed
that since the 1970s “proponents of expanded discovery have made
remarkable progress,” marking an “undeniable trend ... toward
more liberal discovery [in criminal matters].”199 Though it is
accurate to observe that rule changes increased “access of both
defendants and prosecutors to more documents or other items,”200
these changes have not disrupted the status quo: the rules do not
REV. 129, 164 (2011) (noting the growth of the police force relative to the population); Ronald
S. Sullivan, Jr., A License to Search: The Plain Feel Exception Under Minnesota v. Dickerson,
113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 184-86 (1994) (arguing Dickerson
provides a script for officers to avoid the exclusionary rule).
196. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 227
(2007) (“Studies of the federal code document its dramatic growth in the last four decades, and
every state code has expanded as well.” (footnote omitted)); Gershman, supra note 184, at 406
(“To supplement the prosecutor’s already considerable arsenal, Congress over the past twenty
years has passed legislation providing prosecutors with more potent laws than ever before.”).
197. See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2097, 2137-42 (2000) (noting that courts permit hearsay presented by the prosecutor at
a rate higher than other litigants); Gershman, supra note 184, at 407 (stating that mandatory
minimums give “prosecutors greater leverage than ever to compel plea bargaining, force
cooperation, and effectively determine the length of sentences”); Máximo Langer, Rethinking
Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 (2006) (“[P]rosecutors have become some of the main
de facto adjudicators of U.S. criminal procedure.”).
198. Gershman, supra note 184, at 395. These circumstances permit prosecutors to engage
in coercive tactics to secure pleas. See Langer, supra note 197, at 225, 246-47.
199.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of
the Prosecution’s Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 251 (1987) (“For
example ... the defendant has a right to pretrial discovery of his or her confessions and
convictions, as well as reports of scientific analyses of physical evidence.” (footnotes omitted)).
Yet, “the prosecution ... enjoys significantly better access than the average criminal defendant
to crime laboratories to conduct appropriate scientific testing.” Montoya, supra note 186, at
860.
200. Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 932, 938 (1997).
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provide the discretionary power to extract information that is
afforded by civil discovery.201 Though rule changes provide for
additional disclosures within limited categories, prosecutors have
successfully narrowed their scope.202 Despite the massive changes
to civil procedure since the 1940s, criminal procedure has remained
relatively static, permitting the prosecutor easy entrance into the
forum and preserving the prosecutor’s pretrial discretion to main-
tain control over the pretrial distribution of information.203 More
than anything, the perception that criminal discovery has expanded
reveals the internalization and acceptance of the civil and criminal
procedural divide.204
C. Diverging Trajectories
Since the 1970s, the civil forum is characterized by heightened
pleading requirements, a commitment to a formal discovery phase,
and pretrial judicial intervention.205 The criminal forum, in contrast,
201. See Meyn, supra note 25, at 1094 (distinguishing the discretionary power of civil
litigants, as opposed to the limited disclosures to which criminal defendants are entitled);
Jeffrey E. Stone & Corey B. Rubenstein, Criminal Discovery: Leveling the Playing Field, 23
LITIG. 45, 45 (1997) (stating that under Rule 16 of the federal rules, a defendant is entitled to:
“(1) any statement your client was foolish enough to make ... (2) his criminal record ... (3)
documents or physical exhibits to be used by the government at trial; (4) reports of exami-
nations or tests; and (5) expert witness summaries. State prosecutors often have similar
discovery obligations under provisions of state law”).
202. See Imwinkelried, supra note 199, at 253 n.44 (noting that the requirement that the
prosecutor disclose defendant’s criminal record is construed “very strictly” to exclude
uncharged conduct the State planned to use against the defendant, citing cases from the
1980s); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing Makes a
Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 657 (1999) (observing the narrow interpretation courts
give to the requirement of prosecutors to turn over statements of witnesses after
testifying—one court even finding that an FBI report of the witness’s statement did not have
to be turned over). When disclosure is required at trial, some courts hold that a defendant is
only permitted to read the statement before cross-examination. Id. at 668, 688-89 (noting that
some prosecutor offices have policies that are at variance with the strict requirements of the
Jencks Act, and disclose witness statements on the eve of trial).
203. See Meyn, supra note 23, at 40-41.
204. See generally Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The
Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1475-78 (2016) (providing a lens to
understand how the racially targeted imposition of violence and incarceration is not
inconsistent, but consistent with the sanction of law and design of criminal justice).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 62-63.
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features relaxed pleading standards, the absence of discovery, and
little judicial intervention.206
The influence that “haves” bring to bear on the rulemaking
process, and to leverage political influence, is well documented.207
But the judicial alignment with the “haves” also reveals the Court’s
impressive Article III power, to accomplish by interpretation what
it cannot through the rulemaking process.208 The receptivity of an
ideologically aligned Court to establish doctrine responsive to the
preferences of the “haves” is displayed in the development of plead-
ing standards, as the Court departs from plain language to create
favorable conditions for each “have.” Most fundamentally, it is the
procedural divide that permits the creation of two incompatible
standards that cater to the preferences of the “haves.”
III. HOW THE PROCEDURAL DIVIDE MAKES POSSIBLE
CONTRADICTORY RULES: A CASE STUDY
In the absence of a unified forum that would require one inter-
pretation of a rule that governs all litigants, the procedural divide
permits courts to provide contradictory interpretations of similar
rules. This phenomenon is starkly revealed in the interpretation of
pleading standards. Though the “civil have” seeks a heightened
pleading standard, the rule calls for a forgiving one.209 And where
the “criminal have” seeks a relaxed standard, the language of the
rule requires a more demanding path.210 Yet, courts have inter-
preted the rules to command the opposite of their language. The
more demanding criminal rule now requires less of a prosecutor
206. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 59-61.
207. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 67-70; Coleman, supra note 70, at 1018-
23.
208. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 130; Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme
Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093
(1993) (contending that the Court’s unique rule-making authority, with the imprimatur of
Congress, affords courts “a more activist role in the interpretative stage”).
209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that plaintiffs must provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
210. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (stating that the indictment must “be a plain, concise, and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.... For each
count, the indictment ... must give the official or customary citation of the statute”).
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than the more relaxed civil rule. The relaxed civil rule now requires
more of a civil plaintiff than does the more demanding criminal rule.
Civil Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to file a “short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”211
Rule 8’s architect, Charles Clark, signaled a forgiving interpretation
of the rule’s demand in Dioguardi v. Durning;212 he permitted the
plaintiff access to court after divining a claim from almost indeci-
pherable language.213 In 1957, the Court in Conley v. Gibson214
fortified Rule 8’s open court promise, stating that a complaint would
be presumed sufficient unless, “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”215 In 2005, Judge Easterbrook observed
that under Rule 8’s language, “[p]laintiffs need not plead facts; they
need not plead law.”216 “Civil haves” attempted to ratchet up re-
quirements in certain types of cases, or to seek the reversal of
Conley altogether.
These efforts were rewarded in 2007, when the Court retired
Conley in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.217 Twombly prepared the
way for Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which reinterpreted Rule 8 and imposed
a heightened pleading standard in all civil cases.218 Where Judge
Easterbrook thought a plaintiff need not plead facts, Iqbal inter-
preted Rule 8 to require specific factual allegations, the absence of
which would lead to automatic dismissal.219 Meeting this standard
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
212. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
213. See id. at 774.
214. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
215. Id. at 45-46. Buried in the decision is an instruction, negative in construction, that
plaintiff articulate some level of factual specificity in making an allegation. See id.
216. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005).
217. 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007).
218. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 684 (2009). Some courts and commentators
surmised that Twombly was limited to antitrust disputes. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518
F.3d 1042, 1047 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (“At least for the purposes of adequate pleading in anti-
trust cases, the Court specifically abrogated the usual ‘notice pleading’ rule, found in ...
Conley.”); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L.
REV. 135, 137 (2007) (observing Twombly is “perhaps unremarkable from an antitrust per-
spective”); Einer Elhauge, Twombly-The New Supreme Court Antitrust Conspiracy Case,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 21, 2007, 6:15 PM), http://volokh.com/archives/archive_
2007_05_20-2007_ 05_26 [https://perma.cc/FY7Y-ENBP] (noting Twombly was “quite
insignificant” as it merely ratified what was common practice in lower courts). 
219. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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has proven difficult for certain classes of plaintiffs.220 Cases such
as Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordi-
nation Unit221 show why. There, officers conducted a raid on the
plaintiffs’ home that, however fruitless, resulted in the point-blank
shooting of plaintiffs’ dogs.222 Plaintiffs alleged that the sheriff fail-
ed to adequately train the officers.223 Under Conley, the complaint
was adequate: plaintiffs would be granted access to the forum and
permitted to conduct discovery in an attempt to prove their claim.224
But under Iqbal, plaintiffs’ complaint would fail, as plaintiffs did
not possess the information (potentially in the sheriff ’s possession)
needed to make specific factual allegations.225 Beyond factual
specificity, Iqbal still requires more; even if factual allegations are
sufficiently specific, plaintiff must make out a “plausible” claim—a
significant departure from Conley’s requirement to prove the claim
was possible.226 Iqbal instructs a judge to rely on her experience
and common sense in determining plausibility, inviting judicial bias
to inform whether a case remains on the docket.227 Justice Souter,
the author of Twombly, wrote a stunned dissent in Iqbal.228 A major
shift had occurred.
Under Conley, the message to lower courts was clear: unless a
plaintiff pled herself out of court, let her in.229 In Dioguardi, the
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.... [W]e ‘are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion.’” (quoting Towmbly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
220. See Reinert, supra note 53, at 2145.
221. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
222. Id. at 165. This Supreme Court decision is frequently cited in casebooks. See, e.g.,
SARAH E. RICKS & EVELYN M. TENENBAUM CURRENT ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
489 (2d ed. 2015). For a disturbing view of judicial callousness, see Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992) (lower
court belittling the plaintiffs’ loss).
223. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 163.
224. See id. at 164, 168.
225. See Leatherman, 954 F.2d at 1058 (noting that the lower court’s application of a
heightened standard led to the dismissal of the plaintiff ’s claim against the municipality for
being too conclusory).
226. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.... [Plausibility is] a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”).
227. Cf. id.
228. Id. at 688, 699 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority misapplied Twombly
and seeing “no principled basis for the majority’s disregard of the allegations linking [the
defendants] to their subordinates’ discrimination”).
229. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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court reinstated a vague, almost impenetrable pro se complaint
against a powerful defendant, the United States.230 In Conley, the
Court reinstated conclusory allegations of black employees against
a powerful defendant, a railroad union.231 But the Court in Twombly
did the opposite; it reversed a lower court and dismissed a detailed,
legally clear and cohesive complaint against powerful defendants,
telecommunication giants.232 In Iqbal, the Court reversed a lower
court and dismissed a detailed, legally clear and cohesive com-
plaint against powerful actors, the FBI director and the Attorney
General.233 The new message was clear: the failure to dismiss a
complaint will receive close review and the prospect of reversal.
Iqbal received praise from the “civil haves.”234 Lawyers for Civil
Justice, a “partnership of leading corporate counsel and defense bar
practitioners,”235 applauded the decision, opining that Iqbal re-
sponds to “the great injustice done to defendants who in reality have
violated no legal right of the plaintiff, by permitting a plaintiff ’s
unilateral, conclusory, and unsupported assertion of liability to
serve as a form of ‘Open, Sesame’ to impose the enormous and
expensive burdens of almost unlimited discovery on defendant.”236
230. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774-76 (2d Cir. 1944).
231. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 42, 45-48.
232. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint, alleging that
telecommunication companies agreed to anticompetitive behavior, was brought by Milberg
Weiss partners Michael Buchman (formerly in the New York Attorney General’s Office, Anti-
trust Bureau) and J. Douglas Richards (formerly Deputy General Counsel of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission). See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). Defendants hired teams from Kirkland & Ellis, Mayer Brown, Wilmer Cutler,
and Pillsbury Winthrop. See id. at 174-76.
233. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666, 687. Plaintiff was represented by Cardozo Law Professor
Alex Reinert, at the time an associate with Koob & Magoolaghan, and by Haeyoung Yoon,
Director of Strategic Partnerships at the National Employment Law Project, at the time an
associate at the Urban Justice Center. See id. at 665; Nina Bernstein, Top Officials Told to
Testify in Muslims' Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/
nyregion/top-officials-told-to-testify-in-muslims-suit.html [https://perma.cc/P9AW-KZBZ].
234. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appointment Could Reshape American Life, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/us/politics/scalias-death-offers-
best-chance-in-a-generation-to-reshape-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/BX47-HXTZ]
(noting the Roberts Court made “several decisions that pleased business groups” including
“Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which made it easier for trial judges to dismiss cases at the earliest stages
of a litigation”).
235. About Us, LAW. FOR CIV. JUST., http://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/
R9ZV-UTB8].
236. Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., Iqbal and Twombly: Sensible Interpretations of the Pleading
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Arnold & Porter’s Co-Chair of the Product Liability Group observed
that, “the defen[s]e bar has a potentially potent ally in the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard” in lower courts.237 In a July 2009
“Client Alert,” the Proskauer firm wrote, “[c]learly, Iqbal is wel-
comed news to employers who under the prior Conley motion to
dismiss standard, had few options, but to answer ‘generally-pleaded’
complaints.”238 A Law360 feature of a rising star at Kirkland & Ellis
described the antitrust attorney’s ability to use “the heightened
pleading standards of the U.S. Supreme Court[’]s decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal to shoot down undersupported conspiracy
claims.”239
Soon after Iqbal was decided, legislation was proposed to restore
the Conley standard.240 The Chamber of Commerce immediately
called for the proposed law’s successful defeat,241 a call echoed by
Rules, CORP. COUNS. BUS. J. (July 5, 2010, 1:00 PM), https://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
articles/12752/iqbal-and-twombly-sensible-interpretations-pleading-rules [https://perma.cc/
GG4C-NE88].
237. Anand Agneshwar & Paige Sharpe, Twombly/Iqbal Prove Potent in Products Cases,
INT’L L. OFF. ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER (July 19, 2012), https://www.international
lawoffice.com/Newsletters/Product-Regulation-Liability/USA/Arnold-Porter-LLP/Twombly
Iqbal-prove-potent-in-products-cases [https://perma.cc/TRT8-P8GK]; see also Galanter, supra
note 22, at 1380 (“The provision of legal services to [natural persons] and [artificial persons]
is performed by different lawyers .... [T]he upper strata of the bar consist mostly of large firms
whose members are recruited mainly from elite schools and who serve organizational clients;
the lower strata practice as individuals or small firms, are drawn from less prestigious
schools, and service individual clients.... Much ... variation within the profession ... is
accounted for by ... ‘the distinction between lawyers who represent large organizations ... and
those who represent individuals.’” (quoting JOHN H. HEINZ & EDWARD O LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982))).
238. Ashcroft v. Iqbal—The U.S. Supreme Court Articulates a New Pleading Standard for
All Federal Civil Litigation Cases, CLIENT ALERT, L. & WORKPLACE: PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
(July 2009), https://www.martindale.com/litigation-law/article-Proskauer-Rose-LLP_768000.
htm [https://perma.cc/G95W-P8P9]. Jones Day Partner, Mark Herrmann, argued at a Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania debate: “Twombly and Iqbal are right on the law. The rules should
require ‘plausible’ allegations. Why should implausible litigation be allowed?” Mark Herr-
mann & James M. Beck, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 146 (2009). 
239. Dietrich Knauth, Rising Star: Kirkland’s Daniel Laytin, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2013, 1:25
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/425815/rising-star-kirkland-s-daniel-laytin [https://
perma.cc/VR83-CKZL]. The attorney’s client list included Blue Cross, Navistar, Motorola,
General Motors, and Baxter. See Daniel E. Laytin, P.C.-Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
https://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&itemID=7924 [https://perma.cc/
63BG-MWKN].
240. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. §2 (2009).
241. Multi-Industry Letter Opposing S.1504, the “Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009”,
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corporate law firms.242 These arguments in favor of Iqbal conflate a
plaintiff ’s vague claim with a frivolous one.243 A plaintiff may not
possess facts necessary to bring a claim, however meritorious, at the
inception of a lawsuit.244 Since the Congressional threat to restore
Conley has dissolved and Iqbal has remained good law, there has
been a statistically significant rise in the immediate dismissal of
civil rights cases.245
The plain language of Criminal Rule 7 is more demanding than
Civil Rule 8.246 As Judge Easterbrook observed,247 Civil Rule 8’s
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Nov. 30, 2009, 7:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/letter/
multi- industry-letter-opposing-s-1504-notice-pleading-restoration-act-2009
[https://perma.cc/Q8BG-K3HV] (“The proposed legislation is intended to overrule [Iqbal and
Twombly].... Proponents ... contend that Iqbal and Twombly worked a dramatic change in
pleading rules to the detriment of plaintiffs. [In fact] [d]ozens of lower court decisions
preceding Iqbal and Twombly have refused to sustain complaints containing only ‘bald
assertions,’ ‘unsupported conclusions,’ or ‘legal conclusions,’ and they have refused to draw
‘unwarranted inferences’ from a complaint’s allegations.”).
242. Other firms joined in opposition. See John H. Beisner et al., Pending Bills in House
and Senate Seek to Loosen Federal Court Pleading Standards, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Dec. 11, 2009), https://www.martindale.com/matter/
asr-863724.Pending.pdf [https://perma.cc/B575-BJY5] (“The bills are being pushed strongly
by the plaintiffs’ bar as a reaction to two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions [Twombly and
Iqbal].... These decisions confirmed that plaintiffs cannot proceed ... if all they have to offer
are ‘[t]hreadbare recitals’ and ‘conclusory statements.’”).
243. A heightened pleading standard has little impact on institutional players that possess
the information necessary to bring a lawsuit. In a breach of contract claim, for example,
institutional players on both sides of the equation possess actionable facts.
244. The “civil haves” argue that heightened pleading deters strike suits (baseless lawsuits
that threaten the prospect of high discovery costs to force settlement). See Sander Bak &
Jennie Woltz, Iqbal Decision Having Significant Impact on Pleading Standards in Federal
Courts, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP (Aug. 25, 2009), https://www.milbank.com/
images/content/7/9/791/082509_ Bell_Atlantic_v_Twombly.pdf [https://perma.cc/698B-KB28].
Yet, Richard Marcus argued it is just as likely that a heightened standard weeds out
meritorious claims. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 457-58, 484 (1986) (observing that having
little information has little correlation to having a meritorious claim, and “increasing the
discretion of the trial judges to dismiss cases because they sense misuse of the litigation
system ... could undermine the substantive law just as fully as failure to dismiss meritless
suits”).
245. See Reinert, supra note 53, at 2145.
246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (plaintiff must provide “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (prosecutor must
provide “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the
offense charged.... For each count, the indictment ... must give the official or customary
citation of the statute.”).
247. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005).
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language does not require a recitation of facts;248 yet the language
of Criminal Rule 7 does so explicitly.249 A prosecutor must provide
“a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged.”250 Iqbal’s requirement that
a civil party plead specific factual allegations251 seems to reflect the
language of the criminal rule, not the civil rule. In criminal cases,
however, courts will find sufficient a prosecutor’s threadbare
recitation of the elements of a claim, an approach deemed insuffi-
cient by Iqbal and Twombly.252 On the eve of Twombly, the Court
considered the sufficiency of the following pleading:
On or about June 1, 2003, JUAN RESENDIZ-PONCE, an alien,
knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter the United
States of America at or near San Luis in the District of Arizona,
after having been previously denied admission, excluded,
deported, and removed from the United States at or near
Nogales, Arizona, on or about October 15, 2002, and not having
obtained the express consent of the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security to reapply for admission.253
Though Criminal Rule 7 required “essential facts,”254 the Court
found the indictment adequate, as “parroting the language of a
federal criminal statute is often sufficient.”255 That same year, in
Twombly, the Court held that Civil Rule 8 does not permit “a
formulaic recitation of the elements” of a statute.256
248. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
249. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).
252. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 517 S.E.2d 20, 22 (W.Va. 1999) (holding the indictment,
“That on or about the 9th day of March, 1998, in the County of Tyler, State of West Virginia,
Rebekah Leah Wallace, committed the felony offense of ‘Burglary’ by breaking and entering,
in the nighttime, a dwelling house belonging to Donna Lee Miller, with intent to commit a
crime therein, in violation of West Virginia Code Section 61-3-11(a), as amended, against the
peace and dignity of the State” provided defendant with sufficient notice of the claim). The
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure are modeled after the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See W.VA. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
253. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 105 (2007).
254. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
255. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 109.
256. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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Twombly was a conspiracy case;257 the separate and unequal
procedural treatment is put in sharp relief when one compares civil
and criminal conspiracy cases. In criminal law, before federal
reform, the Court held that pleading conspiracy should be subject to
less exacting rigor than the underlying substantive offense.258 After
reform, Criminal Rule 7 governed all claims and required a
recitation of “essential facts.”259 Courts, however, explained away
the term “essential facts” by creating a new term, “evidentiary de-
tails.”260 The term “essential facts” would only mean a “defendant’s
constitutional right to know the offense with which he is charged,”
as opposed to “the evidentiary details by which the government
plans to establish his guilt.”261
After Twombly required specific factual allegations to bring a civil
conspiracy claim,262 courts assessing the sufficiency of criminal
conspiracy ignored the hypocrisy.263 In a post-Twombly criminal
conspiracy case, the Second Circuit stated that “[w]hen ... an indict-
ment ... state[s] the elements of the offense ... th[e] court has
repeatedly refused ... to dismiss ... charges for lack of specificity.”264
In United States v. Crouse,265 the court did not dismiss a complaint
that offered threadbare recitals of the elements, holding that the
prosecutor was not required to describe what agreements were
made.266 In United States v. Singleton,267 prosecutors were not re-
quired to meet any threshold of factual specificity, but only needed
to plead, “the existence of a drug conspiracy” and “the operative time
257. Id. at 548.
258. “It is well settled that in an indictment for conspiring to commit an offense ... it is not
necessary ... to state such object with the detail which would be required in an indictment for
committing the substantive offense.” Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 (1927).
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
260. See United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1172 (5th Cir. 1986).
261. Id.
262. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
263. Robert L. Weinberg, Applying the Rationale of Twombly to Provide Safeguards for the
Accused in Federal Criminal Cases, 7 ADVANCE 45 (2013).
264. United States v. Bout, 731 F.3d 233, 241 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2013)).
265. 227 F.R.D. 36 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
266. See id. at 41.
267. 588 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2009).
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of the conspiracy,” satisfied by alleging an eight-year span, “1995
through March 2003.”268
In contrast, Twombly required plaintiffs to provide specific factual
allegations of any civil conspiracy that, in addition, made out a
plausible claim.269 Civil complaints alleging conspiracy have been
routinely dismissed for being too conclusory. For example, in Xtreme
Power Plan Trust v. Schindler,270 the court stated, “circumstances
of conspiracy [must] be plead[ed] with specificity.”271 Similarly, the
court in Atlantic International Movers, LLC v. Ocean World Lines,
Inc.,272 stated that “[p]laintiff ’s complaint largely fails to attribute
specific actions to any of the parties and makes no specific allega-
tions supporting the existence of an agreement between them.”273
Courts have interpreted the civil and criminal pleading rules to
depart, in opposite directions, from their plain language; the re-
sulting doctrine aligns with the preference of each “have.”274 Subject
to a more forgiving rule, a civil plaintiff must show more than a
prosecutor. Subject to a more demanding rule, a prosecutor must
show less than a plaintiff. This result would be rendered impossible
if the “haves” operated in the same forum, under the same rule. The
consequences are significant. Wielding the power to incarcerate,
prosecutors may reveal little to defendants as they find easy access
to the forum. Plaintiffs, alleging more, are nevertheless routinely
turned away at the gate, even if they have meritorious claims.
IV. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN “HAVES” HAVE IT OUT
What might happen if “civil haves” and “criminal haves” litigated
in the same procedural arena? Would courts readily raise the
entrance fee for plaintiffs if doing so made it harder for a prosecutor
to initiate a case? Would a civil rights plaintiff benefit from a
268. Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added).
269. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
270. 563 B.R. 614 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016).
271. Id. at 647.
272. 914 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
273. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
274. To reach contradictory results, a judge focuses on the plaintiff ’s pleading obligations,
not on whether the defendant has adequate notice. In the criminal context, a judge focuses
on whether the defendant has adequate notice, not on the prosecutor’s pleading obligations.
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prosecutor’s desire for easy access to the forum? What if “civil
haves” and “criminal haves” sat on the same Advisory Committee,
lobbied against each other in Congress, and pushed for competing
interpretations of the same rule in the courts? What happens when
a “have” competes with another “have”? What compromises might
be hammered out? Would “have-nots” receive collateral benefits
from these contestations? The questions are not entirely speculative.
There are examples of “haves” in conflict over procedure. During the
rulemaking process of the civil rules, courts have, on a few occa-
sions, made proposals that contravene the preferences of the “civil
haves.”275
Courts have generally been aligned with preferences of the
“haves.” Since 1970, judges have sat in the majority of Advisory
Committees, and comprised the majority of committee members.276
The Chief Justice appoints these judges.277 This arrangement
permits the Chief Justice to exert influence over the direction of
procedural reform.278 The Court’s power to promulgate is amplified
by its power to interpret those same rules.279 Since the 1970s, the
Chief Justice has signaled alignment with the preferences of the
“haves.” As to the “civil haves,” Justice Burger began to rely more
heavily on selecting judges appointed by Republican presidents and
corporate practitioners and “intensified a partisan slant in the
appointment of judges, and a pro-corporate slant in the appointment
of practitioners, that continued under Chief Justices Rehnquist and
Roberts.”280 Proposals by “civil haves” seek efficiency or proportion-
ality, which align with the interests of courts to reduce delay.281
275. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Joseph L. Dwight IV, Comment, Procedural Politics and
Federal Rule 26: Opting-out of “Mandatory” Disclosure, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 167, 168-70 (1994).
276. Coleman, supra note 70, at 1017 (referring to civil committees). This is a significant
shift because membership of the inaugural civil committee had no judges, see Subrin, supra
note 33, at 710, and just a few judges sat on the criminal committee, see Meyn, supra note 1,
at 727-29.
277. Stancil, supra note 69, at 99 (noting that the Chief Justice appoints members for the
Standing Committee and the Advisory Committees).
278. See Coleman, supra note 70, at 1064. Appointments to the Civil Advisory Committee
ideologically favored conservative ideologies, which is correlated to probusiness, antiplaintiff
bias. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 77-91. 
279. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360-61 (2011).
280. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 33, at 66-67.
281. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 90, at 1587 (“[P]erception that the institutional
interests of the judiciary—in particular, the interest in active judicial management of a
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Dismissing individual plaintiffs early is consistent with a court’s
docket-clearing interests. The preference of the “civil haves” to
regulate discovery by expanding judicial discretion empowers courts
to reduce delay in any particular case. As to “criminal haves,” the
absence of a discovery period relieves the judicial docket. Increasing
pleading requirements would only invite court involvement and
further cause delay; thus, the status quo, however different in each
forum, is typically preferable to both courts and the respective
“haves.”
The interests of the courts and the “civil haves,” however, at times
diverged. In what was perceived as a threat to the legislature’s
deference to judicial autonomy and authority to promulgate proce-
dure, Congress in 1990 imposed reporting measures on courts
through the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA).282 To
placate Congress and avoid further erosion of judicial self-rule,
judges on the Advisory Committee proposed a docket-clearing
measure: mandatory initial disclosures.283 The rule required parties
to turn over information relevant to the dispute at the inception of
litigation.284 This proposal was intended to reduce disputes over
what information should be produced, shortening the average time
burgeoning docket—were no longer in sync with the interests of practicing lawyers, coupled
with the desire to control the agenda of litigation reform, likely played an important role in
the decision by the Chief Justice of the United States.”).
282. Reda, supra note 69, at 1095 & n.35 (noting the absence of any empirical evidence in
the congressional record showing the incidence of “cost and delay”).
283.
[The] Advisory Committee and Judicial Conference faced a threat of usurpation
of their rulemaking authority by Congress .... Judge William Bertlesman
encapsulated the concern, stating that “the incentive to get [the mandatory
disclosure rule amendment] started ... [was] the passage of the Biden Bill, when
it looked as though the Judiciary was going to lose control of itself.”
Yamamoto & Dwight IV, supra note 275, at 197; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15
NEV. L.J. 1559, 1589 (2015) (arguing that the amendments reflected the rulemakers’ “desire
to reclaim procedural lawmaking leadership”).
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (“Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order
or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: (A)
[information regarding] each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information; (B) a copy [or description] of all documents, data compilations, and tangible
things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings.”).
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horizon of a case.285 The rule was unpopular with the “civil haves.”286
With this proposal, initiating a lawsuit with conclusory allegations
would entitle the plaintiff to an immediate dump of the “civil haves’”
dirty laundry.287 Frontloading discovery costs also raised the
prospect of an uptick in strike suits (forcing the defendant to pay on
a frivolous complaint to avoid incurring discovery costs that ex-
ceeded settlement value).288 To appease the clamor of resistance
from lower courts, a revised rule permitted jurisdictions to opt
out.289
In this chapter of “haves” versus “have-nots,” the “civil haves” lost
ground to the “have-nots,” who, by way of filing a claim, however
conclusory, were entitled to information potentially harmful to the
“civil haves.” In 2000, courts and the “civil haves” reached a détente
on initial disclosures.290 The context had changed. Congress had
285. Minutes, Hearing Before the Advisory Comm. on Civil R., 2 (1990), https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV11-1990-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSM4-MDDV]
(“Magistrate Judge Brazil noted that one purpose to be kept in mind is that disclosure should
assist expeditious settlement.”).
286. Burbank, supra note 81, at 1723 (noting that proposals were “predicated in part on
an institutional desire to regain ‘leadership’ from Congress”); Stancil, supra note 69, at 104
(during public comment for the proposed 1991 rule, seventy-six witnesses testified against the
rule, and the committee received over two hundred written statements of opposition); id. at
105 (noting that a revised 1992 proposal attracted one hundred comments, 95 percent
negative); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 842 (1993) (explaining that it was difficult “not to sense
a crisis in federal procedural reform when the Chief Justice’s letter transmitting the 1993
amendments ... disclaimed any implication ‘that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted’”); John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure: The New Rule
That’s Meant to Simplify Litigation Could Do Just the Opposite, 80 A.B.A. J. 85, 85-87 (1994).
287. Relatedly, a plaintiff alleging multiple unsubstantiated claims would nevertheless
trigger the obligation of the defendant to make disclosures, leading to inefficient and
burdensome outcomes for “haves.” See, e.g., Minutes, Hearing Before the Advisory Comm. on
Civ. R., supra note 285, at 2.
288. Despite obvious benefits of the rule, some “have-nots” complained for the sake of
complaining. See Virginia E. Hench, Mandatory Disclosure and Equal Access to Justice: The
1993 Federal Discovery Rules Amendments and the Just, Speedy and Inexpensive
Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 179, 199-201 (1994). 
289. While the committee thought initial disclosures would make case management easier
for judges, some thought the rule unnecessarily interfered with judicial discretion to referee
appropriate discovery. Minutes, Hearing Before the Advisory Comm. on Civ. R., supra note
285, at 2.
290. Morgan Cloud, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules and the Future
of Adversarial Pretrial Litigation, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 27, 46 (2001) (observing that the new rule
relieves attorneys from disclosing “the proverbial ‘smoking gun’”). The change was well
received by the defense bar. See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal
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backed down. The diluted rule was now mandatory in all jurisdic-
tions, but it was limited in scope: “civil haves” were only required to
turn over documents helpful to their case, reducing cost and stra-
tegic harm.291 In that scenario, the “haves” had reached a compro-
mise—this time at the expense of the “have-nots.”
With no prompt from Congress, in 2013 courts attempted to
reduce case delay by empowering judges to narrow the scope of
discovery in any particular case. “Have-nots” fought a multifront
attack: the proposal created proportionality guidelines permitting
courts to expand or decrease the scope of discovery in any particu-
lar case, but also sought to further limit the number of depositions
that were presumptively reasonable in a case—from ten to five de-
positions.292 The “civil haves” advocated for the proportionality
guidelines.293 As to lowering the boom on depositions, the “civil
haves” expressed indifference.294 On one hand, corporate firms in
litigation regularly sought more than ten depositions.295 On the oth-
er hand, whether the presumptive limit was ten or five, “civil haves”
were confident a judge would permit as many depositions as the
“haves” needed.296 The “civil have-nots” resisted; they thought low-
ering the presumptive limit telegraphed to courts that taking any
more than five depositions should be disfavored.297 For the “have-
nots,” the exercise of judicial discretion was something to be feared;
asking for more depositions was not a given, but a fight.298 Due to
the “civil haves” indifference on the issue, the “have-nots” were able
to persuade the Advisory Committee to maintain the higher
presumptive limit.299 In this instance, the Advisory Committee, with
Rules of Civil Procedure & Evidence: A Preliminary Analysis, JOSEPH HAGE AARSONSON LLC,
http://www.jha.com/us/articles/viewarticle.php?9 [https://perma.cc/GX3N-GPKD].
291. Under the 2000 rule, parties had to disclose only information “the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i).
292. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
293. See Hearing on Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 13-14.
294. See id. at 55.
295. See id. at 31.
296. See id. at 41-42; see also Letter from Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney Gen. to The
Honorable David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. Chair, and The Honorable John G. Koeltl 14
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_doj_1.28.14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/325U-CFDF] [hereinafter Letter from Delery].
297. See Hearing on Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 116.
298. See Letter from Delery, supra note 296, at 14.
299. See id. at 2.
2019] THE HAVES OF PROCEDURE 1817
a judicial majority, respected the interests of the “have-nots” in the
absence of pushback from the “haves.”
The contestation between courts and the “civil haves” are instruc-
tive. Compromise may require time; the battle over the scope of
initial disclosures took seven years to resolve. The “civil haves”
improved their position over that time and, though the “civil have-
nots” received diminishing returns, they still emerged as a benefi-
ciary over the battle between the “haves.” Where the “have” is
indifferent, the voices of the “have-nots” may carry the day; stale-
mates between competing “haves” may reveal opportunities for
“have-nots” to gain ground. Depending on the particular issue at
stake, contestation between “haves” can potentially result in collat-
eral benefits for “have-nots.” Structurally, a new dynamic emerges:
in the absence of a procedural divide, courts would have to mediate
between competing preferences of “the haves.” Stakeholders would
be drawn into crosscurrents. Would a court close a door on plaintiffs
if doing so closed the door on prosecutors? What would the Advisory
Committee do when “civil haves” oppose “criminal haves” over dis-
covery matters? Resulting compromises would raise the prospect of
accommodations that provide some procedural benefits to the “have-
nots.”
V. IF THE “HAVES” SHOULD COMPETE IN A UNIFIED FORUM
Subject to civil procedure, if all litigants were governed by the
same rules, what compromises might be expected?300 As to pleading
under Civil Rule 8, prosecutors would be expected to resist Iqbal’s
requirements and push judicial interpretation toward a more
permissive standard. Heightened pleading requirements would add
labor to an understaffed environment,301 invite searching judicial
review, and reduce prosecutorial control over the pretrial narra-
tive.302 Some might question whether a prosecutor would resist
300. The first proposed rules of criminal procedure by the Advisory Committee were largely
based on the rules of civil procedure. See Meyn, supra note 1, at 713. If prosecutors had
engaged with the civil rules earlier, they would have had more influence in its development. 
301. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 266 (2011).
302. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
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Iqbal’s requirements too much; after all, at the time of filing,
prosecutors have sufficient evidence in hand to convict, making
compliance with Iqbal possible, and information required by Iqbal
would eventually be subject to disclosure at any preliminary
hearing.303
These arguments would need to contend with existing prosecuto-
rial resistance to any imposition of a heightened pleading. Iqbal
would, in any case, increase prosecutorial labor. Under Iqbal, a
complaint takes longer to prepare; as it is, “far too few prosecutors
are tasked with handling far too many cases.”304 The higher stan-
dard would incentivize the filing of motions to dismiss.305 In the face
of prosecutorial resistance to Iqbal, the “civil haves” would likely be
forced to give up ground, resulting in a less-onerous pleading
standard that makes it easier for “civil have-nots” to file, for
example, civil rights claims. Prosecutors would also chafe at the
prospect of Rule 11 sanctions for the failure to conduct a reasonable
pre-complaint inquiry, especially if the standard applied to prosecu-
tors reflects prevailing ethical standards.306 Any subsequent lan-
guage diluting the scope and efficacy of Rule 11 would reduce risks
CALIF. L. REV. 539, 669 (1990) (noting the investigation and presentation of trial evidence “are
completely controlled by the police and prosecution”); Gershman, supra note 184, at 451
(“[T]here exists a close nexus between limited discovery ... and enhanced opportunities for
prosecutorial suppression of evidence.”).
303. A Bill of Particulars entitles defendants to what the pleading standard requires.
Louisell, supra note 164, at 68; Traynor, supra note 175, at 233 (“[B]ills are seldom granted.”);
see also United States v. Crouse, 227 F.R.D. 36, 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining why, despite
vague assertions of the indictment, a bill of particulars is not actionable).
304. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 301, at 266. In Brooklyn, defendants are arraigned
between 9:00 AM and 12:00 AM; twenty Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) work the
complaint room in a 6:00 PM to 2:00 AM shift, where one ADA can typically process ten
misdemeanor complaints or three felony complaints. Interview with Jeanine Anderson,
Former Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney (Aug. 2017). In the First Amended Complaint
in Iqbal, twenty-four pages were dedicated to factual allegations that described the basis for
the claims. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) (No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA)). This effort was not sufficient as to named defendants. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683.
305. Preliminary hearings do not occur in federal felonies. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(3). In
state proceedings, cases may settle before prelim or the prelim may be waived. Id. at 5.1(a)(1).
The preliminary hearing and its “probable cause” requirement, id. at 5.1(e), is arguably less
demanding than the Iqbal “plausibility” standard.
306. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 59, at § 3-4.3(a) (“A prosecutor should ... file criminal
charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes ... that admissible evidence will be sufficient
to support conviction.”).
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to “civil have-nots” in incurring sanctions for bringing lawsuits that
pushed factual and legal boundaries.307
“Criminal haves” would resist the imposition of formal discovery.
Most information that permits a prosecutor to bring charges has
been collected before filing charges.308 Prosecutors have little use for
depositions, document requests, interrogatories, and initial dis-
closures.309 Resistance to depositions runs deep; doing little to sup-
plement a prosecutor’s existing arsenal, they provide little strategic
value.310 The State already collects information through witnesses
who voluntarily cooperate, comply with authority, or respond to
threats.311 If need be, a prosecutor can convene a grand jury,
described as a “deposition procedure for the prosecution without the
embarrassing presence of defendant or his counsel.”312 The prosecu-
tor typically initiates a case with an asymmetrical advantage. A
307. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)-(3) (attorneys must certify that “claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and that “the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have eviden-
tiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery” or face
potential sanctions).
308. See supra note 306.
309. See infra note 310.
310. Prosecutorial antipathy towards depositions is longstanding. “I can’t think of a single
instance ... as United States Attorney where the government or the defendant has been hurt
by his inability to take depositions,” remarked Harry Blanton in 1943, “I believe I be-speak
the attitude of all the prosecutors, that they are strongly opposed to the adoption of
[depositions].” 2 DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 122
(Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) (recording remarks by Henry Blanton,
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, at the Judicial Conference for the
Eighth Circuit in 1943, responding to proposed Rule 18). During first efforts to expand
discovery in the 1960s, David Louisell observed that “prosecutors generally evidence strong
antipathy to [depositions] ... made clear by attendance at almost any of their formal
meetings.” Louisell, supra note 163, at 928. 
311. See Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry
into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter 90 (Oct. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Rutgers University) (explaining that as to studies of traffic stop searches, “[w]hat
people perceived they would do ... is very different from what people actually do when
confronted with an asymmetrical authority relationship”); see also Alisa M. Smith et al.,
Testing Judicial Assumptions of the “Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental Study, 14 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 285, 290 (2013) (“Social-psychological research ... unequivocally demon-
strates that reasonable people comply with authority figures.”).
312. Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1191. Under federal procedure, grand jury proceedings
are secret, accessible only to the prosecutor, with few exceptions. United States v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
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deposition threatens this imbalance of power, permitting defendants
to explore counternarratives, develop potential impeachment
evidence, and infill a record subject to the gaze of postconviction
counsel. The right to silence immunizes the defendant from any
deposition.313 Though the deposition does little to improve the
State’s position in a case, the “civil haves” routinely rely on more
than ten depositions per case,314 and would accordingly resist
prosecutorial efforts to dilute deposition rules. Though “civil haves”
are unopposed to lowering presumptive limits (which prosecutors
would support), “civil haves” view depositions as necessary.315 Civil
and criminal “have-nots” would find shelter under the buffer
provided by “civil haves.” Courts would likely ally with prosecutors
in the call for lower presumptive caps and more informal discovery
procedures. Yet, some of these changes would potentially confer ben-
efits to the “have-nots,” as informal procedures (such as jettisoning
the need for a court reporter) tend to favor underresourced litigants
by making the procedure more accessible.316
Prosecutors would resist other discovery tools as well. Where
criminal defendants typically have little to offer in the way of
documents, prosecutors are comparatively document-rich, and it is
easier to request than to respond to information.317 Document
requests and interrogatories threaten caseload backlogs, placing
pressure on the prosecutor to make more favorable plea offers to
avoid the cost of responding. As prosecutors seek out judicial allies
in the effort to dilute these tools, “civil haves” would be expected to
resist any erosion of core attributes of these tools. “Civil haves”
would support efforts of “criminal haves” to put an end to initial
disclosures, which in particular disrupt prosecutorial discretion to
313. If the Fifth Amendment was interpreted to permit compulsion of pretrial testimony,
the value of a deposition, for the prosecutor, would appreciably increase. Akhil Reed Amar &
Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 857, 898-99 (1995).
314. See Hearing on Civil Procedure, supra note 55, at 31.
315. See id. at 30-31.
316. See Meyn, supra note 25, at 1096. Procedures in New Mexico adopt informal
procedures for taking depositions that incur less cost than the typical civil deposition. See id.
at 1110.
317. “It is almost invariably cheaper to ask for materials than to produce them.” SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 45 (3d ed. 2012).
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distribute pretrial information.318 Yet, courts insist on initial
disclosures to reduce case delay. In addition, prosecutorial resis-
tance itself would experience some factures, given an emerging
openness within the prosecutorial community to institute open-file
policies that mimic key features of the initial disclosure rules.319
In sum, the imposition of a formal discovery phase would not
appreciably enhance power already possessed by the “criminal
haves”; yet, it would significantly enhance the ability of “criminal
have-nots” to extract information, investigate defenses, and delay
prosecution to provide leverage in plea negotiations.320 “Criminal
haves” would be expected to make some inroads on restricting dis-
covery. Prosecutors would seek favorable interpretations of civil
rules that contemplate limitations based on proportionality factors.
For example, as to the civil rule that parties must consider “the
importance of the issues at stake,”321 prosecutors would likely seek
bright-line rulings that curtail discovery in certain classes of cases
such as misdemeanors.322 This tiered approach might give rise to
cross-pollination; a limitation on discovery in misdemeanors might
translate to a ceiling on discovery in civil cases with low damages.
Despite the expected efforts of prosecutors (sometimes in conjunc-
tion with courts) to dilute formal discovery, “civil haves” (sometimes
318. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?
A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) (noting that a prosecutor can be expected to
share very little where “the defendant might benefit most from [information], that is, where
the government’s case is weak”).
319. It remains to be seen whether open-file policies are indicative of a new openness to
expanded discovery or, rather, will serve to deflect the increasing calls for formal discovery.
320. The imposition of formal discovery would make the ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC) standard more demanding. See Roberts, supra note 34, at 1121-22. A defense attorney
would need to provide a strategic reason for any decision not to request discovery; thus,
counsel would be incentivized to file discovery. Discovery would also afford the defendant the
opportunity to depose a victim, making retraumatization possible. A prosecutor may offer a
better plea deal to avoid such a scenario.
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
322. Florida restricts depositions to categories of witnesses and generally prohibits
depositions in misdemeanors. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(D) (“No deposition shall be taken
in ... a misdemeanor or a criminal traffic offense ... unless good cause can be shown.... [T]he
court should consider the consequences to the defendant, the complexity of the issues
involved, the complexity of the witness’ testimony ... and the other opportunities available to
the defendant to discover the information sought by deposition.”); see also Paul W. Grimm,
Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 130 (2017).
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in conjunction with courts) would seek to maintain core characteris-
tics of formal discovery. “Civil have-nots” would find shelter in areas
deemed critical by the “civil haves.” Where “civil haves” identified
acceptable areas to narrow the scope of discovery, they would find
strong allies in prosecutors. Yet, any changes that mitigated costs
or injected a degree of informality potentially would benefit “haves”
and “have-nots” alike.
There is, with any regime change, the prospect of unintended
consequences. Within a unified forum, segregation might persist
informally. Judges might facilitate two systems under the same
code: one system responsive to the “civil haves” who seek judicial
intervention and the other responsive to “criminal haves” who seek
a pretrial vacuum. The introduction of formal discovery may push
the initial review of the integrity of criminal charges to a newly
emboldened, but overwhelmed, public defender. Not all of these
questions are theoretical. Existing criminal jurisdictions experi-
menting with civil procedure concepts will provide opportunities for
insight as to how civil rules might be absorbed in criminal cases and
how doing so might impact “have-nots.”
Contestation and compromise might do more than reshape ex-
isting civil rules. Prosecutorial defiance to civil rules might dissipate
over time due to the entrenchment of new norms as incoming pro-
secutors, who never practiced under a different regime, replace the
old guard. A unified forum also has the potential to change percep-
tions about litigants. A feedback loop exists between the content of
a rule and how parties subject to that rule are perceived—a
constitutive theory of law.323 The qualitative work of Jenia Turner
and Allison Redlich reveals such a connection between procedure
and perception.324 In Virginia, which limits disclosures, approxi-
mately 50 percent of the prosecutors thought early release of in-
formation to a defendant would result in witness intimidation; in
North Carolina, which provides for an open-file policy, approxi-
mately 10 percent of prosecutors shared such fears.325 The proce-
323. Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-constitutive
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1413 (2000).
324. See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286 (2016).
325. See id. at 359.
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dures in these jurisdictions correlate with perceptions held by
defendants.
In the civil forum, Twombly and Iqbal feed the narrative of the
frivolous plaintiff,326 whereas Conley assumed a more dignified
plaintiff.327 In the criminal forum, denying discovery tools to a
criminal defendant reinforces the perception of dangerousness and
lawlessness; furnishing the defendant with discovery and agency
goes some distance to restore the innocence presumption. Contesta-
tion and compromise would also influence the act of judging; any
predisposition to craft a rule supporting a “have” would risk under-
mining the interests of another “have.” The segregation of procedure
has also led to the segregation of state court rotations; a more
robust and fluid rotation in a unified forum would reduce aspects of
capture by one set of “haves.” The impact of a unified forum would
be profound; similarly, the procedural divide has had deep conse-
quences to the development of procedure in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The status quo of procedural segregation permits each “have” to
fight a one-front battle against each respective “have-not.” This
segregation has had a profound influence on the development of
procedure in the United States. The arrangement has dampened
contestation in the forging of rules and has permitted inequalities
between the “haves” and “have-nots” of each forum to persist or
grow. On the civil side, close studies of rulemaking since the 1970s
have documented a steady erosion of the commitment to open courts
and open discovery.328 Individual plaintiffs bringing civil rights and
consumer claims now face growing procedural hurdles to access the
judicial forum. On the criminal side, procedure is marked by infor-
mation asymmetries between the prosecutor and the indigent
criminal defendant.329 The procedural disparities that afford prose-
cutors unfettered discretion facilitates high-volume processing with-
in the criminal system. The criminal justice system is increasingly
326. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 215, 224 and accompanying text.
328. Coleman, supra note 70, at 1014, 1018-19.
329. See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
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framed as one of design, and current, unsustainable conditions have
triggered a reassessment.330 Within this reassessment, there is a
renewed focus on procedural fairness, and despite the persistent
narrative of prosecutorial disadvantage, some jurisdictions are
integrating civil discovery rules into their criminal codes through
judicial and legislative means331 as emerging scholarship challenges
the civil and criminal procedural divide.332
Moving towards a unified procedure may go some way in putting
an end to the procedural protectionism granted to both “civil haves”
and “criminal haves.” Operating under a single forum, the opposing
objectives of prosecutors and “civil haves” would likely engender
compromise and pull the most extreme procedural practices toward
a more neutral center. All litigants would likely encounter a reori-
entation. The prosecutor would likely experience an increase in pre-
trial transparency and judicial scrutiny of assertions and claims.
The criminal defendant would likely experience a more active role
in developing and exchanging pretrial information.333 The institu-
tional player on the civil side, likely finding some success in efforts
to narrow the scope of discovery, would also see the litigation spigot
loosened, increasing the inflow of individual plaintiffs. Facing a
tightening regime of discovery practice, individual civil plaintiffs
330. See ALEXANDER, supra note 187, at 13 (framing mass incarceration as a permutation
of Jim Crow); Butler, supra note 204, 1475-78 (reframing the response to the criminal justice
system crisis in terms of a “Third Reconstruction”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1368 (2012) (“[C]riminal process starts to look increasingly ad hoc, a
practice of social control in search of a justification.”).
331. Darryl K. Brown, Discovery in State Criminal Justice, in III REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 147, 148 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (observing a “distinct trend toward requiring much
more pretrial disclosure in criminal litigation”); Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules
Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 102-03 (2017) (finding courts are
crafting local rules to import civil procedure concepts into criminal disputes); Turner &
Redlich, supra note 324, at 289 (“[A] recent trend has been in the direction of earlier and
broader discovery.”).
332. See Brown, supra note 34, at 1625 (favoring integration of civil discovery tools into
criminal adjudication); Gold, supra note 34, at 123 (challenging demarcations between civil
and criminal disputes); Gold et al., supra note 34, at 1639-40 (proposing integration of civil
discovery to inform plea bargaining); Meyn, supra note 25, 1095-96; Meyn, supra note 23, at
83; Roberts, supra note 34, at 1100 (linking the low standard for IAC to lack of discovery in
criminal cases); Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 34, at 121 (challenging the justifications for
the civil and criminal procedural divide).
333. Goldstein, supra note 34, at 1192 (“The sum of the matter is that the defendant is not
an effective participant in the pretrial criminal process.”).
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would at least find an easier path to litigate. Within a unified pro-
cedural forum, one would expect renewed and significant engage-
ments over core pleading and discovery issues. Most likely, the
“have-nots” would benefit from the emerging détentes.

